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QKD and high-speed classical data  hybrid metropolitan network 
Abstract 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently receiving much attention as it provides a secure 
source of encryption keys [1-3]. Discrete-Variable QKD (DV-QKD) is possible for single 
photon transmission in QKD to-coexist with and encode classical wavelength division 
multiplexed (WDM) data with appropriate system design. Nevertheless, previous QKD field 
trials adopted either or both of key relay via trusted nodes and transparent link via optical 
switching. The former requires guaranteed physical security of the relay nodes, but can expand 
key distribution distance arbitrarily [4]. The latter can realize key establishment for more users 
with less complexity of key management over an untrusted network. To realise the adaption of 
the QKD system for future high speed and long distance metropolitan world exploitation at 
lower cost, there has to be investigations on existing fibre infrastructures.  
Prior to this work, previous researches over similar distances feature extremely low secure key 
rates. For example, the Swiss Quantum Network between three sites displayed secure bit rates 
of 2.5 kbps at a fibre length of 17km [5]. Quantum Key distribution within the 25km Cambridge 
Quantum Network have demonstrated the highest long-term secure key rates yet demonstrated 
in a field trial of at least 2.5Mb/s which is the fastest and much higher than 0.8 kbps which was 
reached over the similar channel loss field trial up to date [6]. Additional field trials have been 
performed on the UK Quantum Network using a 66km path having 16dB loss. Combined 
wavelength division multiplexed 2 x 100 Gb/s traffic encrypted using QKD co-existing on the 
same fibres has operated for several months, with a long-term key rate of 80kb/s that is also 
faster than any other similar long-term QKD trial systems [7, 8]. 
In addition to this advanced commercial QKD system, there have been secure key rate analysis 
comparisons between laboratory fibre coils and practical field trials more than field trials only 
conducted before [4] [6] [7] [9]. These comparisons help to identify factors that limit future 
QKD network scale in both quantity and quality aspects. Also, the limit for the highest secure 
key rate at longest fibre length QKD in the multiplexing environment is discussed and 
determined in this research thesis. 
Nevertheless, in this thesis, improvements have been made to minimise the corresponding 
negative effects by investigations on the dependence of temperature have been done in order 
to ensure system operation environment effects. It was found from the trial results that there 
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exists a relationship between temperature and secure key rate [4] [6] and further study has been 
done to evaluate the system sensitivity to operating temperature. Although the conventional 
DV-QKD system, original BB84 coding scheme, was designed to exploit the quantum 
properties of single photon polarization states, the trial equipment operates based upon the 
phase coding schemes. These coding schemes are based on the properties of interferometers 
and the coding is implemented by changing the relative optical path lengths or phase between 
the internal arms of the interferometer, while in the real transmission environment, temperature 
or polarization variation happens unpredictably. 
The existing polarisation controllers operate at relative low speed align within the 
interferometer, which slows to operation environment such as a punch to fibre causing phase 
difference. Therefore, in this project, there has been an improvement in the QKD-WDM system 
performance by adding an external polarization controller to minimize the Raman noise and 
increase the secure key rate at the longest fibre length up to date.  
In Summary, transmitting quantum keys over a coil of fibre in the lab differs a lot from actually 
putting it in the ground. This work contrasts the world fastest QKD system at the longest 
distance in field trials with lab fibre reels and then characterises and identifies two of the key 
factors, temperature and polarizations, influencing performance in practical wavelength-
multiplexed secure communication systems. This is a significant step towards the coexistence 
of the quantum and conventional data channels on the same fibre for metropolitan networks 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Cryptography is an art of keeping information secret, which has special historical significance. 
In more recent times, since the second world war, cryptography has become an indispensable 
feature of today's society [10]. Cryptography is a branch of a larger field called cryptology. 
The other branch of cryptology is cryptanalysis, which is associated with code breaking.  
Cryptography is aimed at encoding and decoding information, in a way that cannot be 
understood by a third party [1]. Conventionally and traditionally, the sender is named as ‘Alice’, 
the receiver is named as ‘Bob’ and the third party trying to intercept their secret communication 
is commonly referred to as ‘Eve’. As shown in Figure 1.1, Alice encodes her secret message 
(plaintext) using a cipher (algorithm) and a key to produce a message (cipher text) and sends 
it to Bob. Bob then decrypts the message using the cipher and the key to retrieve the secret 
information. The ‘one-time-pad’ (OTP) cipher is a known encoding method with provable 
security. It was first introduced by Gilbert Vernam in 1926 [11] and the security of this cipher 
was proved by Claude Shannon in 1949 [12]. OTP is a symmetric cipher and the key is as long 
as the information to be sent. Information is secure provided that the key material is never 
reused. With a provably secure cipher, the problem of secure communication is reduced to how 
to distribute secret keys.  
 
Figure 1.1 Encryption process 
In general, the principle of a conventional network is to communicate between users by 
replicating data and then transmitting the resultant copy, however, the quantum mechanics 
differs from these rules significantly, as it prevents directly creating any corresponding 
unknown, arbitrary and independent copies of quantum states. Whereas in classical 
communications where valuable data can be unknowingly intercepted, fragile quantum data 
can only be unique unless the network can use teleportation or perform teleportation-derived 
techniques [13]. In a word, quantum communication is to exchange the quantum states over 
 
 13 
links, typically using optical fibre and it cannot be easily realized without the support of 
substantial conventional communication. 
1.1 Overview of Cryptography  
1.1.1 Classical Cryptography 
In classical cryptography, there are two main methods of distributing cryptographic keys. One 
is a trusted messager, and the other one is a public key encryption systems [14]. It is unrealistic 
for couriers to hand out keys because it depends on the delivery logistics and their efficiency. 
Although control measures can be taken, there is no absolute way to know if critical material 
has been tampered with [15].  
In public key cryptographic systems, keys used for encoding and decoding are different. In 
such systems Bob chooses a private (decoding) key, from which he derives, through calculation 
the corresponding public (encoding) key which is announced publicly [16, 17]. Anyone 
interested in communication with Bob, for instance Alice, encodes her information using this 
public key and only Bob is able to retrieve this secret information since he possesses the private 
key for decoding. Anyone else not possessing the private key has to face a complex calculation 
to decrypt the information. The security of such algorithms is then based on calculating some 
complex, one-way mathematical functions. In public key cryptography, the encryption key is 
public, unlike the secret decryption key. The users create and publish a public key based on 
two large prime Numbers and a secondary value. Primes are secret. Anyone can encrypt a 
message through the public key, but it can only be decoded by someone who knows the prime 
number. This is the case for the RSA algorithm [1, 10, 18], introduced by Ronald Rivest, Adi 
Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977, whose security is based on factoring large integer 
numbers.  
However, these algorithms have not been proven secure and any development in algorithms to 
factor large numbers may hold serious implications for security. Fast factorisation has already 
been shown to be possible with a quantum computer [19] and major efforts are continuing to 
be made in this field. So, either an overnight mathematical discovery or a breakthrough in 
quantum computers would impose a serious threat on information security.  
Symmetric cipher cryptographic systems widely used by society at large are the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [20] and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [21]. The 
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length of the key is of the order of a few hundred bits. Again, this key is encrypted with the 
plaintext in a mathematically complicated manner with permutations and nonlinear functions 
and provides computational security [22].  
The fibre industrial of America began in the early 1980s. At that time, systems could was able 
to operate at 90 Mb/s. At this level of data rate, a single optical fibre was able to handle about 
1300 voice channels at the same time. Nowadays, communication systems are about to 
typically operate at 10 Gb/s and even higher. That means it can support the capacity of more 
than 130,000 simultaneous voice channels. Over the past five years, new technologies have 
been developed and improved such as dense wavelength-division multiplexing (DWDM) and 
erbium-doped fibre amplifiers (EDFA) have been used successfully used to further increase 
data rates to more than a terabit/second (>1000 Gb/s) over distances in excess of 100 km [23].  
However, by adopting QKD today, organisations can protect their communication 
infrastructure from the massive and changing cyber threats not only today but also those of 
tomorrow. Already, hackers have used techniques such as harvesting and decrypting, today 
scraping and storing data for decryption once they have the ability to do so through advances 
with supercomputers, implementing quantum computers or newly discovered cryptographic 
techniques. Therefore, with quantum cryptography solutions such as QKD, any data that 
requires long-term protection is not only secure in today’s IT environment, but also secure in 
the future in the coming quantum age. 
1.1.2 Quantum Cryptography 
Based on quantum mechanical principles, quantum key distribution (QKD) promises a solution 
to the problem of the distribution of keys. For the first time, security can be proven and 
quantified. The information is represented in a physical form e.g. the quantum state of a photon 
known as a quantum bit or ‘qubit’. Security arises from the measurement principle of quantum 
physics [24], which states “Measurement of a quantum system in general disturbs the state of 
the quantum system.” [1] Furthermore, the ‘no cloning theorem’ in quantum physics states that 
“It is not possible to duplicate unknown quantum states.” Therefore eavesdroppers cannot 
faithfully copy the quantum information, which is otherwise possible in the classical world [1, 
10]. For instance, when an eavesdropper tries to glean the quantum communication information 
between Alice and Bob, she inevitably introduce perturbation to the quantum communication 
system and thus her presence is revealed. This is the unique feature of a QKD system as it 
provides not only unconditional security but also the ability to detect eavesdropping. 
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Unconditional security is defined as security which is independent of the computational power 
and resources available to an eavesdropper.  
QKD protocols can be divided into three types of protocols, namely discrete variable (DV), 
continuous variable (CV) and distributed phase reference protocols. These protocols are 
described in the review article by Scarani et al [2]. Irrespective of the protocol implemented, 
the essence of the security of a QKD system is based on encoding upon non-orthogonal 
quantum states [25, 26]. The protocols differ mainly on the detection schemes used for their 
implementations. DV-QKD and distributed phase reference protocols utilise photon counting 
while CV-QKD uses mainly homodyne detection. CV-QKD benefits from the relatively low 
cost p-i-n diodes for the detection [27]. However, this benefit is outweighed by their significant 
overhead cost for error correction [2].  
1.2 Protocols of Quantum Key Distribution 
Detecting the existence or non-existence of an eavesdropper based upon quantum mechanics 
is the main idea of Quantum Key Distribution. Alice and Bob, that is transmitter and receiver 
respectively, exchange quantum states in the link during the protocol. Basically, an 
eavesdropper (Eve), will measure and evaluate the states that have been or are being exchanged 
to understand the corresponding data values. Such a process is known as surveillance or 
hacking and should be avoided for security purpose in practical applications. And the 
eavesdropper’s measurements do cause the collapse of the quantum state. It has been proposed 
that, in theory, sensitive statistical methods could reveal the changes caused by Eve’s 
measurements, and even if Eve tried to reduce or constrain her measurement; there has 
implications for the state. In addition, the longer time Eve attempts to measure and learn, the 
more likely and chances she is to be detected [28]. As time goes, it is not of any possibilities 
for Eve to be unnoticed at all. In a word, QKD is therefore an unconditional approach by all 
means [29-31]. 
1.2.1 BB84 protocol 
The Bennett-Brassard protocol [32], which is also known as BB84 was proposed and published 
in 1984 by Charles Bennett and Giles Brassard,  here Alice transmits a series of individual 
photons to Bob who aims to measure the photons once they arrive the end. Definitely, there 
will be a numbers of photon that never reach the end and cannot be detected. For those that 
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have been arrived, some of the signals are kept and treated as key material while rest of them 
are utilized to find out where Eve is and how she works [33]. 
 
Figure 1.2.1.1 Schematic of BB84 protocol (taken from [25]) 
Figure 1.2.1.1 illustrates the fundamental BB84 protocol principle, here Alice can theoretically 
encode a bit using a qubit based upon any basis. Alice’s original conventional bit will be 
detected when measure in the original basis. However, the state of the qubit will be altered if 
measurement in a distinct basis hence as a consequence a subsequent measurement may 
possibly lead to a different bit. Therefore, if a wrong basis is used for Eve’s measurement 
because it passes her and the information will be let to go on to Bob who will measure it based 
upon the right basis and distinguish the qubit that has been altered during the process [34]. 
In theory, polarization is the most straightforward and simplest approach that Alice could 
utilize and the protocol runs in several steps as follows:  
1) Alice sends quantum states to Bob, utilizing two bits which are of classical form. For each 
qubit she sends to select both the encoding basis she has used (+ or ×) and the bit she has sent 
(0 or 1); 
2) Bob receives and measures the qubits that has sent by Alice, and Bob uses an arbitrary 
classical bit or quantum effect to determine the measurement basis; 
3) The qubits Bob has received will be informed by Alice over a public channel;  
4) Both the bases used by Bob and Alice will be exchanged via a public channel while Bob’s 
messages could be combined with step 3). The measured bit will be kept if and only if both 
Alice and Bob chose the same basis. Otherwise it is sifted. 
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At this stage, both Alice and Bob have their own set of optical quantum bits. If there were no 
eavesdroppers, the two sets would theoretically be the same. In practice, however, two things 
are required to ensure that if these sets of quantum bits are designed as an encryption key. One 
is to perform the real eavesdropping detection and error correction on the remaining quantum 
bits. A standard classical error correction should be applied to the rest of the key. Finally, it 
should use this technique to remove the last bit of doubt. It's called privacy amplification, and 
it's based on classical information theory. 
The protocol begins when Alice sends Bob a very large number of qubits over the quantum 
channel. Bob will record all the bits arrive at his end and measure each qubit by using randomly 
bases. Statistically, an average 50% possibility of Bob’s measurements will be correct for the 
remaining bits.  
However, if Eve exits and tries to intercept some of the qubits at any point between Alice and 
Bob, Eve has to make random choice from either of the base to measure the qubits that she 
want to measure. Thus because Eve intercepts and hacks 50% of the qubits and then only the 
other 50% will be sent to Bob. When Eve measures, copies, and re-sends this hacked 
information to Bob, only 50% would be the same as the original information theoretically. As 
a consequence, 75% (i.e. 50% + 50%*50%) of the qubits will technically get to the Bob end 
which are the same as Alice’s intensions. At this point, once Bob receives and measures the 
qubits randomly as before, it will lead to a new accuracy of 62.5%. Whereas Bob doesn't know 
the existence of Eve at this stage, so he and Alice have to send each other some information to 
figure out how accurate the information Bob has received. And this step is called error 
correction. Once Bob has measured all the qubits he has received, he will turn to the classical 
channel and send Alice a string of bits, telling her which bases he has used to measure each of 
the qubits. Once Alice receives the message from Bob, she checks her personal record and 
sends message to Bob, telling him which quantum bit bob has finally measured correctly.  
In cryptography, the one-time pad (OTP) is an encryption technique that cannot be cracked, 
but requires the use of a one-time pre-shared key the same size as, or longer than, the message 
being sent. In QKD schemes the quantum signals are used to generate the shared secret key 
rather than to encode the message itself, which is subsequently communicated using the 
classical one time pad scheme. Providing Alice and Bob wish to transmit secure information 
between each other, the only way that they both can be absolutely sure there is no eve between 
them is to use a one-time pad and no key will be reused. Now Bob can abandon the distinct 
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qubits, and Alice can do the same so the whole process is a one-time pad which means no key 
is reused in order to reduce the copy and resend attacking probability.  
The photon number splitting (PNS) attack is one example of a loophole based attack on the 
standard BB84 protocol. It was first introduced by Brassard et al. [35]. The problem here is 
that the photon source used by Alice is not a truly single photon source as assumed by the 
protocol. In fact, pulsed attenuated laser sources are usually employed in QKD systems. Such 
sources always have a non-zero probability of emitting a pulse with more than one photon. 
These multi-photon pulses can be exploited by an eavesdropper in the PNS attack. In this attack, 
when a multi-photon pulse is discovered from the incoming stream of photon pulses emitted 
by Alice, Eve splits the pulse and stores it in her quantum memory and forwards the rest to 
Bob. Later on when Alice and Bob carry out bases reconciliation, Eve can obtain enough 
information to reconstruct part or all of the final key; crucially without detection[36].  
To discuss the security of quantum cryptography, here is a simple example of an intercept-
resend attack by Eve, who measures each photon in a randomly chosen basis and then resends 
the resulting state to Bob. For instance, if Eve performs a rectilinear measurement, photons 
prepared by Alice in the diagonal bases will be disturbed by Eve’s measurement and give 
random answers. When Eve resends rectilinear photons to Bob, if Bob performs a diagonal 
measurement, then he will get random answers. Since the two bases are chosen randomly by 
each party, such an intercept-resend attack will give a bit error rate of 50% × 50% + 50% × 0 
= 25%, which is readily detectable by Alice and Bob. Complicated attacks against QKD do 
exist but fortunately, the security of QKD has now been proven [37].  
Traditionally, cryptography has been a continued battle between the hackers and the 
programmers. On one hand, hackers try to exploit the system loopholes and breach the security 
while programmers try to come up with a solution to counteract the attack on the system. A 
solution to the PNS attack was found around a decade ago by a modification of the standard 
BB84 protocol. This is now known as the ‘Decoy protocol’.  
1.2.2 Decoy state protocol 
This protocol is attractive since its implementation only requires a minimal modification of the 
existing hardware used for the BB84 protocol. This idea was first introduced by Hwang [20]. 
‘Decoy’ pulses here are simply photon pulses from an attenuated laser with a different mean 
photon number. These pulses are in addition to the photon pulses used to transmit the usual 
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key information (termed ‘signal pulses’) [38]. Decoy pulses are randomly interleaved in the 
signal pulse stream. This time the PNS attack by Eve fails in the following way. Again, Eve 
tries to implement the PNS attack by completely blocking the single photon pulses and splitting 
the multi-photon pulses. Eve stores one photon from the multi-photon pulses in her quantum 
memory and forwards the remaining photons to Bob. However, Alice has intentionally 
introduced decoy pulses along with the signal pulses [39]. As the decoy pulses are randomly 
distributed in the signal pulses Eve cannot distinguish between them. By analysing the 
transmission and QBERs of the decoy pulses, Alice and Bob can detect Eve’s presence even 
though a true single photon source is not used [40].  
With the decoy state protocol not only unconditional security but also transmission distances 
in excess of 140 km can be achieved as shown by Lo et al [39]. Another big advantage of the 
decoy protocol is that higher mean signal photon numbers can be used, which increases the 
secure bit rate. It was also suggested that for implementing the practical decoy protocol only 
two classes of decoy pulses are sufficient. Each class has a different mean photon number. 
More rigorous security proofs can be found in the paper by Ma [41].  
1.2.3 T12 protocol 
Practical experimental components are not perfect and this has to be taken into account in the 
security proof. For example, most security proofs assume a single photon source. However, the 
attenuated laser source with the decoy technique was used in the experimental work. Also, it 
is often assumed that the amount of data available to the experimentalist is infinite. This is 
described as the ‘asymptotic scenario’. However, a real system deals with only finite data 
samples and thus the description in the asymptotic scenario has to be replaced by one in the 
finite size regime instead. If the finite size effect is ignored, the secure key rate is overestimated, 
because there is an assumption that the acquisition accuracy of QKD parameter is infinite, 
where there are errors in the actual applications. Due to statistical fluctuations of the sample, 
this type of error needs to be accurately quantified and included in the security proof. Finally, 
the technical progress in the QKD field requires high efficiency protocols hence the efficient 
BB84 protocol has to be implemented. To address these issues, a new ‘T12’ protocol was 
introduced by Lucamarini et al. [42], which is quantifiably secure in the finite size scenario as 
well as efficient. At the same time, it removes a few idealisations and bridges the gap between 
theory and practice.  
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The security proof of T12 protocol is based on the finite size security proofs described in [43-
45] and offers several advantages. Firstly, it provides universally composable security [46, 47], 
which implies the key is secure irrespective of the application it is used for. Secondly, it neither 
requires a random permutation of the users’ string prior to the classical post processing stage 
nor to encrypt error corrected information [48, 49].  
1.3 The quantum bit and properties  
For the BB84 protocol, Bob randomly switches between the rectilinear and diagonal of his 
basic states and then measures the photons sent by Alice. These detected events form the ‘raw 
key’. When Alice and Bob use the same bases, their results are correlated. Otherwise they will 
get uncorrelated or irrelevant results and they discard these type of quantum bits in the end. 
The sequence of retained bits is known as the ‘sifted key’. Although the sifted keys are highly 
correlated, they differed in some bits, i.e., quantum bit errors, resulting from either the system 
imperfections, such as detector dark counts, or eavesdropping. The ratio of the number of errors 
to the total number of sifted bits is defined as the quantum bit error rate (QBER). 
In order to predict the performance of a given QKD scheme, the key distribution rate before 
error correction and privacy amplification 𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤  can be estimated by experimental parameters 
and the formula is as follows [1, 2, 50], 
 
𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤=qµv𝜂𝑡𝜂𝑑                   Eq (1) 
                                           
q is a systematic factor which depends on the implementation chosen. For instance, in the case 
of the BB84 four states protocol, it is equal to 
1
2
, because the bases that Alice and Bob randomly 
selected are incompatible half the time, µ is the average number of photons per pulses. In a 
more rigorous treatment, this quantity should be replaced by the probability of a pulse 
containing at least one photon. Assume it is small, it is well approximated by the average of 
the Poisson distribution. v is the repetition frequency and 𝜂𝑑 is the detector efficiency. Finally, 




10                    Eq (2) 
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where 𝐿𝑓 corresponds to the attenuation in the fibre in dB/km, 𝑙 to the length of the link in km 
and 𝐿𝐵 to Bob’s internal losses in dB. 
The QBER stated above can be evaluated as the ratio of the probability of getting a false 
detection to the total probability of detection per pulse: 






+ 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡=𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡                         Eq (3) 
 
𝑝𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒  and 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡  are the probabilities are the probabilities of recording counts caused by noise 
and photons, respectively, while 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡 is the probability of photons reaching the unexpected 
detector. The value of QBER consists of two parts. The first one, called 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑡, is caused 
by the noise counts, mainly due to the dark counts from detector. The second part 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑡 is 
the propagation of photons to the wrong detector due to incorrect phase or polarisation 
measurements. When the transmission distance goes up, the transmission efficiency 
𝜂𝑡becomes lesser, while 𝑝𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒  will not change. This leads to an increase of 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑡, which 
imposes the principal limitation on long distance QKD. Gisin et al. [1] shown that QBER is 
lower than 15% and  can establish security key immunity against any personal attack by means 
of error correction and privacy amplification. However, the individual attack is not the most 
powerful attack against the BB84 Protocol actually compared to the asymptotic scenario. 
Walter O. Krawec et al. [51] derived a new proof of security and key-rate bound for a three 
state BB84 protocol. They showed that this new key rate bound, in addition to the use of 
mismatched measurement outcomes, can tolerate the same maximal noise level as the four state 
BB84 (i.e., the key rate is positive for all Q ≤ 11%) in the asymptotic scenario [52, 53].  
In a word, the threshold of QBER=15% corresponds to the security of the BB84 protocol 
against the so-called "individual attacks", which is NOT the most powerful attack against the 
BB84. When consider attacks more powerful than the individual attack, the security threshold 
decreases to 11%, but only in the so-called "asymptotic scenario", i.e., when acquire data "for 
an infinitely long time". This is clearly impossible in a real experiment, where data can be 
acquired only for a finite amount of time (e.g. 10 seconds or 10 minutes...). When take this 
"finite-time scenario" into account, the threshold decreases again, and can easily reach 6-7%, 
depending on the amount of data acquired in the finite time. Toshiba's system takes all these 




As is described in previous sections, with the help of formulas, the raw key creation rate 𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤 
and QBER are given experimental conditions. Since the errors in the raw bit sequence are 
suppressed during key distillation, the useful key creation rate 𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑙  which follows the error 
correction and privacy amplification – forms the only truly significant value. Therefore, it is 
necessary to determine to what extent 𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤  is reduced by the key distillation procedures, as a 
function of the QBER. The number of bits lost in the process of error correction as a function 






          Eq (4) 
This expression is valid for small QBER. Rec increases with the error rate, which implies that 
it is important to keep it low. On the other hand, the fraction of bits lost through privacy 
amplification can be estimated by 
𝑅𝑝𝑎 = 1 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(
1+4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅−4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅2
2
)        Eq (5) 
Assuming that all the errors are caused by Eve’s tampering and she can gain the information 
of 4 QBER / √2  or about 2 QBER / ln2 at most. This assumption demonstrates that the average 
number of photon per pulse µ is as usually small as 0.1 to ensure that the lower ratios of the 
pulses contains more than one photon. If this condition is not reached, the estimate does not 
apply in this case. 
Finally, the useful key creation rate can be estimated: 
 
𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑙 = 𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤(1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐)(1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐)       Eq (6) 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
% = (1 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐)(1 − 𝑟𝑝𝑎)     Eq (7) 
Figure 1.3 Theoretical simulation of Final key rate of sifted rate vs QBER 
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1.4 Motivation for the research in this thesis 
The potential for general purpose quantum computers to be able to break the cryptographic 
systems currently used to secure networks has resulted in increased interest in quantum 
cryptography for secure data transmission. QKD provides an inherently secure method of 
cryptographic key generation at distant points on a network. This thesis focus on using DV-
QKD to provide keys for high data rate classical WDM transmission secured by the [22] AES 
standard. The challenge is simultaneous transmission of single photon QKD signals in the same 
fibre as 100Gb/s coherent WDM signals, which are more than 60dB higher power.  
QKD must be designed to operate at telecommunication wavelengths and have high secure bit 
rates so as to coexistence with exiting telecommunication links at low cost [55]. The secure 
key rate of QKD systems was often limited to a few kbps due to poor performance of the single 
photon detectors. Higher secure key rates are demanded for scenarios such as a network shared 
by many users or high bandwidth applications such as video transfer and the performance of 
the single photon detector has been dramatically improved for DV-QKD system [56]. Hence, 
it is necessary to have the hybrid system on trial and then study the restrict factors for real QKD 
network links compared with laboratory demonstrated experiments. 
Although the traditional DV-QKD system, the original BB84 coding scheme, was designed to 
take advantage of the quantum properties of single-photon polarization states, the experimental 
equipment operates based upon the phase coding schemes. These encoding schemes are based 
on the properties of interferometers and the encode by changing the relative optical path lengths 
or phase between the arms of the interferometer. However in actual transmission environment, 
the change of temperature or polarization is unpredictable [57]. 
Raman noise has to be greatly drawn attentions in such a hybrid link rather than traditional 
communication systems, because the classical channel power in hybrid link is as 70 dB higher 
as quantum channel. And such a huge difference will lead to unexpected noise photons arrive 







So far, most experiments and field trials have been conducted on dark fibre only. Since dark 
fibre is a scarce and expensive resource, it is urgent to make QKD coexist with data signals on 
the same fibre to build a hybrid quantum network. However, studies conducted before this 
research  have been limited to very low bit rates, short fibre lengths, and/or one-way data 
communications. With the adoption of new protocol (i.e. T12) and commercial equipment, this 
research demonstrates that QKD has error-free bidirectional Gbps data transmission with a 
secure bit rate three orders of magnitude higher than previously reported and figured out  
factors that affect the hybrid quantum network followed by an optimisation method. 
Chapter 1 was a brief introduction to classical and quantum cryptography techniques. The 
novel key distribution method based on quantum physics, followed by explanations of the 
various protocols including BB84, decoy BB84 and T12 were introduced in some detail. Serval 
key parameters such as QBER used for describe QKD system performance were briefly 
discussed here. Moreover, the motivations for pursuing the research were elaborate and thesis 



















Chapter 2. Quantum Network Characterisation 
Chapter 1 compares conventional cryptography with quantum cryptography in terms of data 
rate, limitations and practical application ranges. And also the significance of quantum key 
distribution is to improve the security level of the existing encryption measures, but also to 
prepare for the future emergence of the quantum computer to prevent threats to the security of 
the existing communication encryption technology. Hence Chapter 2 aims to demonstrate the 
general components and system implementation of a high speed communication channel 
encrypted upon quantum key distribution. 
2.1 Introduction to quantum network 
Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution, offers the possibility of secure key 
distribution that guarantees confidentiality through quantum mechanics [58]. This opens up the 
interesting possibility of communication systems rely solely on fundamental laws of physics 
to provide security, rather than on the principles of mathematical complexity that underlie 
today’s cryptography. Most of the studies on actual QKD systems focus on extending the 
transmission distance of point-to-point optical fibre and free space optical links, with the 
purpose of establishing national or global-scale security key exchange and management 
network [59-62].  
So far, there has not enough attention been drawn to the development and establishment of 
QKD access networks, especially metropolitan quantum networks or larger-scale QKD secured 
access networks, which aims to connect end users to these secure network infrastructures. In 
principle, a broad access network topology is feasible for QKD [63], but standardized solutions 
developed primarily for traditional high-speed communication requirements are likely to end 
up providing the lowest cost and thus the most practical solution.  
Therefore, the encryption method of QKD on existing conventional communication 
infrastructures which is also constructing quantum network is feasible and low-cost. The data 
speed has exceeded 100Gbps over tens or even hundreds of kilometres of point-to-point single-
mode optical fibre communication. If the encryption technology of QKD can be combined with 
this high-transmission rate optical fibre communication, it is the foundation for the construction 
of a high-speed transmission network without security risks in the future against quantum 
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computer’s threat. Then, the following will cover the basic components of a quantum network 
and the constraints that can actually be encountered [64]. 
2.2 System characterisation 
2.2.1 Single Photon Source 
Attenuated pulsed lasers are promising light sources for QKD. Although they emit multi- 
photons as well as single photons, their performance approaches that of a true single photon 
source when used for example in a decoy protocol system (described in Chapter 1) [39]. With 
present technology, a commercial-available laser is able to offer many benefits such as compact 
packaging, cryogenics-free, operation at telecommunication wavelengths, low power 
consumption and low cost [65].  
 
Figure. 2.2.1 Schematic of an attenuated light source QKD system 
The schematic for an attenuated light source based on a pulsed laser is shown in Figure 2.2.1. 
Coherent pulses of light are emitted from the laser and the light is split into two parts by a beam 
splitter (BS). One path is monitored using a power meter and the other part goes into a 
calibrated attenuator. The attenuator is used to reduce the photon flux of the laser pulses down 
to the single photon level. The power meter is used for calibration of the photon flux. In practice, 
a pulse might contain two or more photons. This is because the distribution of the photons in a 
pulse follows Poissonian statistics and is given by [1, 66]: 
p(k, μ) =  𝑒−𝜇
𝜇𝑘
𝑘!
                 Eq (8) 
where μ is the average number of photons per pulse and k is the actual number of photons in a 
pulse. For instance, for μ=0.2,then p(0,0.2)=0.82 , p(1,0.2)=0.16 and p(2,0.2)=0.02. As is 
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introduced, p(1,0.2)=0.16, such a source is vulnerable to the PNS attack when used in a QKD 
system [36, 67]. The eavesdropper could split the multi-photon pulse in order to acquire 
information without detection. To overcome this problem, the decoy technique has been 
implemented as described in Chapter 1. For the experiments described in this thesis, a 1 GHz 
pulsed laser source has been used and embedded into a Toshiba QDK system.  
2.2.2 Communication Channel 
Transmission media for QKD include free space channels, ground to satellite communication 
channels, and fibre-based point-to-point links. In this section, free space channels and ground 
to satellite communication channels are briefly summarised before describing in detail fibre-
based point-to-point links, which are utilised in this thesis. 
An example of a free space QKD experiment is a single photon entanglement-based free space 
QKD demonstration over a distance of 144 km using polarisation encoding and closed loop 
tracking at the receiver [61]. In 2007, a QKD experiment was carried out using the decoy state 
BB84 protocol over a similar free-space link, yielding a secure rate of 12.8 bit/s with a channel 
attenuation of 35 dB. In this case at the receiver end, the light was collected by two telescopes 
using an active tracking technique in order to ensure optimal coupling [68-70].  
In an attempt to extend the transmission distance, in-orbit satellites are used to allow quantum 
communication between the receiver ground stations via the satellite  [71]. This is the most 
basic arrangement; however, variations have been studied. Recently, researchers have explored 
QKD performance when the transmitter and/or receivers’ platforms are moving. This was 
accomplished by utilising an airplane moving at 290 km/h separated by a distance of 20 km 
from the ground. The mean sifted bit rate and QBER were 145 bit/s and 4.8% respectively 
using the BB84 protocol with a predicted secure bit rate with the decoy protocol of 7.9 bit/s 
[72]. Also, ground station to satellite QKD has been extensively tested in different test beds, 
for example, using a transmitter on a turntable to simulate an orbiting satellite. Another 
example is placing the transmitter in a hot air balloon to explore the effect of a vibrating or 
floating platform. This experiment also explored the effect of a high loss environment where 
the transmitter and receiver were separated by 96 km with a loss of 50 dB. In the floating and 
moving platforms, secure key rates of 150 bit/s were obtained on average with a QBER of 
2.8%, while in the 96 km case the rate fell to 48 bit/s owing to a QBER of 4% [73]. 
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In both free space and satellite based QKD a direct line of sight and favourable weather 
conditions are required. This is because the results of the system can be affected by temperature, 
humidity gradients and wind speeds. The alignment of such systems is challenging and they 
are also inefficient in terms of secure key rates.  
The electronic polarization controller (EPC) can be used before the interferometer in the QKD 
receiver in order to compensate for the constant rotation of the output polarization caused by 
the birefringence of the transmission fibre and environmental motion and expansion. The EPC 
is continuously driven based on the feedback signal provided by the detector count rate. 
The stabilization subsystem is related to the time variation of the photon during transmission, 
which is mainly caused by the expansion and contraction of the fibre due to the change of the 
ambient temperature. The clock delay of the receiver is adjusted according to the detected 
photon count rate so that the arrival time of the photon is always matched with the detector's 
gate cycle centre and the phase modulator cycle centre. 
In this thesis, an optical fibre-based point-to-point link QKD configuration has been used. 
Silica optical fibre has emerged as an attractive choice as a transmission medium because of 
low signal attenuation, immunity to electromagnetic interference, high transmission bandwidth, 
low raw material cost and long haul transmission [74]. Some of the practical aspects of the 
fibres are discussed here.  
The fibre output optical power, P𝑜𝑢𝑡 , as a function of fibre distance, L, can be expressed as 
P𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑒
−𝛼𝐿 , where 𝑃𝑖𝑛  is the input optical power, α is the fibre attenuation coefficient 
expressed in the unit of km−1. The loss of the silica single mode (SM) fibre is dependent on 
the wavelength as shown in Figure 2.2.2. Typically, the loss of the fibre at 1550 nm is 0.2 
dB/km [75]. The three distinct absorption peaks in the loss spectrum occur due to interaction 
of OH ions with Silica. The dominant remaining factors for the loss in the fibres are material 
absorption and Rayleigh scattering. Rayleigh scattering is a loss mechanism in the fibre, which 
is due to local fluctuations in the refractive index that are smaller than the wavelength of the 




Figure 2.2.2 Attenuation in silica fibre (directly taken from[75]) 
2.2.3 “Plug and play” QKD system 
A traditional experimental QKD system called “plug&play” first suggested in 2002 by Stucki 
et al [76]. “Plug&play” scheme is a two-pass auto-compensating scheme, which is commonly 
used when phase encoding [77]. Figure 2.2.3 demonstrates a schematic diagram of the optical 
part which consists of a transmitter (Alice), receiver (Bob) and quantum channel (SMF).  
 






Receiver Bob is the multi-photon light pulse source generated by laser. The wavelength of light 
is 1550.86 nm, and the laser pulse duration is 5 ns. First, the light pulse passes through a 
circulator C and enters a 50/50 beam splitter b. Half of the pulse passes through the short arm 
of the Mach Zehnder interferometer into the polarization splitter (PBS). The second part passes 
through the long arm of the interferometer, which consists of a delay line (DL) and a phase 
modulator (PM), and then also enters PBS. 
After passing through PBS, the two parts of the pulse pass through the quantum channel SMF 
to the transmitter Alice, where they pass through the variable optical attenuator (VOA), the 
memory line (SL), and the phase modulator (PM). After reflection mirror Faraday (FM), 
rotating light polarization, again in 90 to the exit at the end of the optical pulse reach Alice. 
The advantage of the scheme is that the interferometer can be automatically compensated, and 
the interferometer can work without feedback system, so as to compensate the uncontrollable 
phase change of the optical signal from the sending end to the receiving end. However, since 
the light signal travels in both directions, reverse Rayleigh scattering reaches the receiver's 
single-photon detector, which can significantly increase the noise level [78].  
2.3 Technique for a hybrid QKD with classical data communication system 
Optical wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) is a technology capable of explosive growth 
of Internet and telecommunication traffic in wide fibre communication networks, metropolitan 
scale optical communication networks and local communication networks. The WDM is used 
to divide the 50 Hz bandwidth of a single fibre into different wavelength channels and multiple 
non-overlapping frequencies. Each WDM channel can operate at any speed, for example, a 
peak electron speed of several thousand megabits per second (Gbps). At the current stage, 
commercially available optical fibres can provide more than 100 of these wavelength channels, 
all of which are capable of speeds in excess of a gigabit per second [79-81].  
However, even though a single fibre strand has a wavelength channel that has speed over 
gigabit-per-second and over a bandwidth over terabit-per-second, to support the traffic 
connections, a rate that is lower than the full wavelength capacity may still be required by the 
network. These low-rate traffic connections can have minimum capacity as 51.84 Mbps or even 
lower and maximum capacity to full wavelength. For network operator, being able to groom 
the multiple low-speed traffic connections onto high-capacity circuit pipes is very vital if the 
performance improving and saving network cost are needed. In transport systems, when 
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operating cross-connections of conversions, whether between multiple systems or within same 
system, grooming is used to describe the optimization of capacity utilization.  
The process of mounting many wavelengths onto a single fibre is called wavelength division 
multiplexing. Wavelength division multiplexing is able to equip multiple independent and 
separate channels onto optical fibre, which is also can be called as Analog multiplexing 
technique. Hence, WDM technology can be used to increase total communication bandwidth. 
By reducing the channel spacing and increasing the bit rate, one can increase the transmission 
capacity of wavelength division multiplexed systems. In order to increase the extent of 
broadband information distribution, normally an erbium-doped fibre amplifier to boost signal 
power is used in WDM systems as well as low dispersion fibres. Figure 2.3(a) shows the 
schematic of a wavelength division multiplexing technique where N channels which are all 
different wavelength/frequency are combined by an optical multiplexer and then transmitted 
onto a single fibre and de-multiplexed at the end of the fibre [79, 82].  
 
Figure 2.3(a) Schematic of wavelength division multiplexing and de-multiplexing  
Wavelength division multiplexing has had great impact in high capacity transmission systems 
with large capacity in recent years. The first wavelength division multiplexing systems only 
carried two signals however wavelength division multiplexing systems nowadays can carry up 
to 160 signals. Multiplexer is adopted in the transmitter-ended systems to combine multiple 
signals together. On the contrary, De-multiplexer is adopted at the receiver-ended systems to 
separate those signals. Generally, two types of wavelength division multiplexing are used 
extensively, Dense wavelength division multiplexing(DWDM) and coarse wavelength division 
multiplexing(CWDM) [79, 83]. 
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DWDM shown in Figure 2.3(b) is the a type of wavelength division multiplexing for optical 
fibre communication technique and is designed for long distance transmission where 
wavelengths are densely integrated together. Dense wavelength division multiplexing is the 
process of multiplexing multiple signals onto a single fibre where each fibre has a series of 
parallel optical channels. Each optical channel is using many different light wavelengths that 
can transmit data serial-by-character or parallel-by-bit. CWDM (coarse wavelength division 
multiplexing) does not span long distance since the light signal of coarse division multiplexing 
is not amplified. Therefore, the cost is reduced but also propagation distances are limited to 
maximum value. Compared with DWDM, the channels used in coarse division multiplexing 
are often fewer. Additionally, for metro carriers who prefer to start small and expand as the 
demand increases, these channels may be sufficient. With retaining high loss tolerance, the cost 
has been kept down by the signalling systems. Every time when implementing a trade-off 
between the capacity and distance a non- amplified signal is used. Filtering of light and 
multiplexing or de-multiplexing of different wavelengths are the two functions performed by 
CWDM and both of them are travelling in a same medium [84, 85]. 
 






Table 2.3 Comparison between CWDM and DWDM performance [84] 
Types CWDM DWDM 




Laser Cooled Lasers 
Capacity(Max.) 
18×10 
Gbps 192×10 Gbps  
Application 100 km 5000 km  
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2.4 Review of Quantum networks  
2.4.1 Overview of QKD systems 
Early QKD systems required dark optical fibre connections to avoid light-polluting sensitive 
quantum signals from other data transmissions. Putting a fibre in this way means huge 
deployment costs, and it makes commercial sense to be able to send quantum signals along the 
same fibre as traditional data [72, 86-88]. 
Implementations of QKD are more than only the experimental phase. A series of Quantum key 
distribution systems have been demonstrated in laboratories all over the world in recent years 
and also some of the laboratories are supported and funded by governments, for instance, NIST 
and LANL in the United States [60] and NICT in Japan [89], and at corporate laboratories, 
such as HP, IBM, NEC, NTT and Toshiba. MagiQ Technologies [3] and id Quantique [76], 
are two of the largest companies in the world who had commercialised Quantum Key 
Distribution gateways for several years and the products from both companies incorporate 
classical encryption for the bulk data as well as providing the QKD itself. Metropolitan-area 
testbed networks have been built in Boston, Vienna, Geneva, Barcelona, Durban, Tokyo, P.R 
China and elsewhere in the world [90-92].  
Toshiba has developed a system that can transmit quantum keys over optical fibre, as well as 
classical data. In core and metro networks, high data rates and performance are key issues, 
while in access networks, it is important to limit the cost of providing services to a large number 
of users, so these technologies are optimized. Reducing the cost of delivering QKD services to 
end users can be achieved by using a quantum access network, where many users are serviced 
by a quantum receiver. In figure 2.4.1(a), multiple users share a photon detector. Customers 
need only cheaper components to send to quantum receivers. The standard passive fibre 
combiner is widely used in fibre to enterprise and fibre to home applications. 
 
Figure 2.4.1 (a) Access Quantum Network Schematic (directly copy from [93]) 
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2.4.2 Tokyo QKD network 
The Tokyo QKD network which is shown in Figure 2.4.2(a) is based on JGN2plus (Japan’s 
Gigabit Network) [94]. Overall, JGN2plus is an open testing network with more than 100 
research projects using JGN2plus's services. The network can be viewed as a star network, 
connecting the operations centre in Otemachi with NICT's headquarters in Koganei, as well as 
the university of Tokyo in Hongo and NICT's research facility in Hakusan[94]. The QKD 
network field trial in Tokyo has demonstrated a QKD system with a bit rate of more than 
1Mbit/s. This allows high-bandwidth applications such as high-speed video encryption to be 
secured using quantum methods. Secure video encryption and intercepted eavesdropping 
attacks have been demonstrated. Long field trials were also carried out. The transmitter was 
installed in the server room of a high-rise building in central Tokyo's Otemachi district. The 
recipient is located at NICT's Koganei facility in the greater Tokyo area. The two ends are 
connected by a 45-kilometer urban fibre optic cable. Although approximately 50% of this fibre 
is ground routed on poles and is therefore subject to weather and traffic interference, it was 
found that the safe bit rate of QKD is very stable in [94-96].  
 
Figure 2.4.2(a) Tokyo QKD Network (Directly copy from [94]) 
 
2.4.3 Untied States QKD  
Figure 2.4.3 illustrates a structure of Boston-rea network supported by DARPA [97] that was 
the world’s first Quantum networking deployed QKD network. Basically, there exists 10 nodes 
in the DARPA QKD network shown below, running several distinct QKD implementations. 
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Single photons are generated by the laser with attenuated and weak coherent pulses from the 
first four nodes which is Bob, Alice, Anna and Boris. And both Alice and Anna are technically 
transmitters while Bob and Boris are the receivers at this stage.  
It is reported that there exists a typical error rate around 5% in one of the links in the DARPA 
network hence the substantial error detection and correction are extremely desired to be taken 
into account for QKD implementations. One of the protocols that can be used to overcome and 
manage the errors is the cascade protocol developed by Brassard and Salvail [98].  
The most common protocol for managing these errors is the Cascade protocol developed by 
Brassard and Salvail [99]. BBN implemented both Cascade and their own Niagara forward 
error correction (FEC) protocol and it results in a bit error rate of 3%.  
 




2.4.4 UK and Cambridge QKD network 
In this thesis, the Toshiba QKD system, which is introduced in previous section, has been 
utilized for research. Toshiba's prototype Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system delivers 
digital keys for cryptographic applications on fibre optic based computer networks. Based on 
quantum cryptography it provides a failsafe method of distributing verifiably secret digital keys, 
with significant cost and key management advantages. The system provides world-leading 
performance. In particular, it allows key distribution over standard telecom fibre links 
exceeding 100 km in length and bit rates sufficient to generate 1 Megabit per second of key 
material over a distance of 50 km — sufficiently long for metropolitan coverage. 
Beyond a Point-to-Point network and adopting to the existing infrastructure of current 
conventional data system is more reasonable and many research organizations are making their 
own efforts. It also has been demonstrated and been building a network based key distribution 
(>Mb/s) and quantum encryption over the Cambridge Quantum network [81]. The general 
geographical illustration is shown in Figure 2.4.4(a). The networks consist of several different 
transceiver ends including Centre for Advanced Photonic and Electronic (CAPE), TREL, 
Cambridge University Engineering Department, University CNF, BT and NDFIS at Duxford.  
 
Figure 2.4.4(a) geographical illustration for UK and Cambridge QKD network 
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For the QKD network, the fibre links were populated with ADVA classical 10/100GbE 
networking equipment [100] shown in Figure 2.4.4(b). The QKD links between each node were 
tested progressively and will be discussed in next chapter. In other word, the initial test was a 
fundamental point-to-point QKD signal only test. Then a QKD point to point links with 
intermediate node (e.g. from CAPE to Engineering department and then to TREL) were tested. 
Next, 100 Gbps classic data signal were tested in the similar way to QKD signals and once the 
tests between each single link are completed, the combined conventional and QKD signals 
(100Gbps traffic + QKD) were combined together and run simultaneously on the fibre links.  
 
Figure 2.4.4(a) UK and Cambridge QKD network set-up 
Table 2.4.4 summaries some results for DV-QKD systems and it could be easily concluded 
that the secure rate decreases with the incensement of link length.  
Table 2.4.4 Summary of Demonstrated DV-QKD System 
 
 Author(s) Distance(km) Secure Bit Rate(kbps) 
Dyes et al. 20 10 
Rosenberg et al. 100 0.02 
Sun et al. 25 805 
Sun et al. 50 89.8 
Dixon et al. 20 1020 
Dixon et al. 100 10.1 
Zhao et al. 15 165 
Tanaka et al. 97 0.79 
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Table 2.4.5 Summary of existing QKD system 
2.5 Hybrid quantum network limitations and difficulties 
2.5.1 optical fibre  
Optical fibres suffer from dispersion that broadens the temporal duration of the optical signal 
pulse as it propagates through the fibre [101]. For high data rate classical communication this 
effect can be problematic. Due to dispersion in the high data rate regime the optical signals 
from neighbouring clock cycles can overlap causing adjacent bits to become indistinguishable. 
This is known as inter symbol interference (ISI), which deteriorates the quality of the optical 
signal [102]. Similarly, for quantum communication the effect of dispersion is problematic. If 
the detector active on time is long, dispersion can cause photons from adjacent clock cycles to 
be detected in the same gate period causing an increase in ISI and QBER.  
Single mode (SM) optical fibre experiences non-uniform stress due to the fibre drawing process 
and/or environmental effects such as vibration and temperature. These effects break the circular 
symmetry of the SM fibre core resulting in cross sectional shape variation along the length. 
 
Tokyo Geneva China This Research 
Protocol Decoy BB84 SARG 
Decoy 
BB84 T12 
Number of nodes 6 3 9 3 
Longest Link 45km 14.4km 85.3km 10.6km 
Highest key rate 
300 
kbps 2.4kbps 16.2kbps 2.5Mbps 
Operation time 1 day 600 days 212days 580days 
Data Mux No No No Yes 
Data Bandwidth No No No 200Gbps 
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Two orthogonally polarised modes will travel at different speeds and this is known as modal 
birefringence. The fibre can now support two orthogonal polarisation modes with differing 
group velocities, traditionally termed as the fast and slow axes modes. The axes alignment is 
not constant along the fibre and light launched into fibre transforms into an arbitrary 
polarisation state. The energy is interchangeably transferred between the fast axis and slow 
axis modes and this leads to polarization mode dispersion [101]. Typical values of PMD for 
modern fibres are less than 0.1 ps/√km. Since the PMD increases with square root of distance 
its contribution is comparatively smaller than chromatic dispersion [101].  
In some special types of fibres, birefringence is maintained so that the two orthogonal 
polarization modes are not coupled. These are called polarization-maintaining (PM) fibres. 
Note that polarization-maintaining optical fibres do not polarize light as polarizers do. Instead, 
the PM fibre maintains the linear polarization of linearly polarized light, provided it is emitted 
into a fibre aligned with one of the fibre’s polarization patterns. Shooting linearly polarized 
light into the fibre at different angles excites two polarization modes, transmitting the same 
wave at slightly different phase velocities. At most points along the fibre, the net polarization 
will be an elliptic polarization state, returning to the original polarization state after integer beat 
length. Thus, if a visible laser is fired into a fibre and two polarization modes are excited to 
observe the scattering of the transmitted light from the side, periodic light and shade patterns 
will be observed at each beat length, since the scattering is preferentially perpendicular to the 
direction of polarization. This may be used as a communication medium for the QKD channel, 
but it is not practical for real world fibre networks, as most installed fibre is SM [1].  
2.5.2 WDM system 
The coexistence architecture based on WDM technology was proposed by Townsend in the 
late 1990s [103] and studied later [87, 104-107]. These studies indicate that the existence of 
strong classical traffic may be detrimental to the QKD channel. This is because classical signals 
are usually many orders of magnitude stronger than quantum signals. Therefore, even a small 
crosstalk from a classic channel can override normal QKD operations. One possible method is 
to place the quantum signal in the "original" or o band of 1300 nm, and the classical signal in 
the "traditional" or c band of 1550 nm [87]. For such a large wavelength separation, both 
classical signal leakage and anti-stokes Raman scattering can be effectively suppressed to a 
tolerable level. In many cases, however, it is beneficial to have both quantum and classical 
signals in the c-band. For example, fibre loss is significantly lower in c-band than in o-band; 
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Therefore, the safe distance of QKD can be extended. In addition, this architecture is more 
compatible with today's fibre optic networks [108]. 
In a typical coexistence architecture based on WDM, the noise photons in the quantum channel 
can be contributed by several sources [87, 106, 107], including the leakage photons from 
classical channels due to the finite isolation of DWDM components, the ‘in-band’ noise 
photons generated in optical fibres from nonlinear processes, such as four-wave mixing (FWM) 
and spontaneous Raman scattering, and the in-band amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) 
photons generated by optical amplifiers. Here, in-band noise refers to noise photons within the 
spectral bandwidth allocated to the quantum channel. In this section, we quantify the noise 
photons contributed by each of the above sources based on a typical WDM configuration as 
shown in Figure 2.5.2. In the schematic, an erbium-doped fibre amplifier (EDFA) was 
employed to boost the optical power of classical channels before multiplexing with quantum 
channels. Furthermore, we assume that all the classical channels are placed at wavelengths 
longer than that of the quantum channels, since the spontaneous anti-Stokes Raman scattering 
(SASRS) is typically weaker than the spontaneous Stokes Raman scattering. 
In this thesis, we assume that the eavesdrop (Eve) can control all the classical channels, but she 
cannot access the multiplexer (MUX) and de-multiplexer (DEMUX) used for multiplexing 
quantum signals with classical signals. A special case is that classical signals are actually used 
by Alice and Bob for authentication, error correction, and privacy amplification [107]. 
Figure 2.5.2  Scheme for multiplexing QKD with classical data 
(NB: the two squares in the figure are the internal structures of Alice and Bob instruments, and there 




a) Amplified spontaneous emission (ASE)  
As we all know, the ideal noiseless amplifier does not exist [109]. In the case of an optical 
amplifier, the basic noise comes from spontaneous emission. The ASE in the actual EDFA has 
a broadband bandwidth of tens of nanometers. Within the spectrum bandwidth of the quantum 
channel, it can be regarded as a broadband noise source with flat spectral power density. We 
note that a real laser source also has a wideband noise background, which can be simulated 
from a virtual optical amplifier as ASE. 
The average ASE photon number in one spatiotemporal mode is given by [110]: 
〈𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐸〉  = 2𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝐺 − 1)ℎ𝑣               Eq (9) 
Here factor 2 accounts for the two orthogonal polarization modes. G is the gain of the EDFA, 
and 𝑛𝑠𝑝 ≥ 1 is the spontaneous emission factor. If spontaneous emission is the only noise 
source (no excess noise), 𝑛𝑠𝑝 = 1. 
In practice, the excess noise of an EDFA is commonly quantified by its noise figure (NF). In 
the unsaturated regime, NF is related to 𝑛𝑠𝑝 by [110] 
NF =  
1+2𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝐺−1)
𝐺
                         Eq (10) 
In the high-gain range(G≫ 1), NF≅ 2nsp . 
In general, the ASE power is much lower than the classical signal. However, it's bandwidth is 
much wider and extends to the quantum channel. Therefore, ASE can cause in-band noise. 
Fortunately, the MUX used by the Alice end acts as a bandpass filter, greatly suppressing this 
in-band ASE noise. Given across the strait of isolation MUX is deduced 𝜉1 , in-band ASE 
photon number (per space-time mode) at the output of the MUX is defined as[110], 
〈𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐸
(𝐴)
〉 = 2𝜉1nsp(𝐺 − 1)                 Eq (11) 
In this thesis, the “out-of-band” ASE noise were not taken into consideration since they are 
significantly weaker than the classical signals themselves. 
b)  Leakage from the classical channel  
Although the wavelength of the classical signal is different from that of the quantum signal, 
due to the limited isolation of DEMUX, a small part of the classical signal will leak into the 
quantum channel. In the BB84 QKD system, this leakage leads to out-of-band noise, which 
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can be further reduced by using a spectrum filter at the receiver end. In the Gaussian modulated 
coherent state (GMCS) QKD system, this leakage puts the noise photon in LO's "mismatched 
mode". 
We define the power of the classical signal output from the communication fibre as P𝑜𝑢𝑡. Given 
the isolation of the DEMUX 𝜉2, the power of the leakage signal received by Bob is P𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘 =





                          Eq (12) 
Here ℎ is Planck’s constant and 𝜈 is the frequency of the classical signal. 
c)  Spontaneous Raman scattering (SRS) 
When the strong classical signal is propagated along the optical fibre, noise photons of different 
wavelength will be generated through various nonlinear optical processes. If the wavelength of 
the noise photon is the same as the wavelength of the quantum signal, they cannot be filtered 
out at the receiving end, resulting in in-band noise. The results show that SRS is the main 
nonlinear process when the quantum channel is in the short wavelength of the classical channel 
[87] [107].  
The spontaneous Raman scattering noise power within a bandwidth of ∆λ (measured at the end 
of optical fibre in Figure 2.4) is given by [87] 
𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑆 = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝛽𝑧𝜂𝑐ℎ∆𝜆 = 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡𝛽𝑧∆𝜆        Eq (13) 
Here β is the spontaneous Raman scattering coefficient, 𝑃𝑖𝑛 (measured at input of optical fibre 
in Figure 2.4) is the input power of the classical signal, z is the fibre length and 𝜂𝑐ℎ is the 
transmittance of the optical fibre.  
To estimate the noise photon number per spatiotemporal mode, we first use the relation ν = c/λ 
to determine the total mode number corresponding to a bandwidth of ∆λ and a time window of 
∆t = 1s to be Nmode = |∆ν∆t| =
c
λ2
∆λ and c is the speed of light in vacuum. 
Given that the insertion loss of DEMUX is 𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑈 , the in-band SRS photon number(per 









𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡𝛽𝑧𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑈             Eq (14) 
d)  Four-wave mixing (FWM) 
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FMW is a third order nonlinear process produced by the 𝜒3 nonlinear fiber in the presence of 
two or more pumps. In order for the FWM process to be effective, phase matching conditions 
are required. Although FWM may be a major source of noise at very short distances, it is much 
weaker than Raman scattering at the actual fibre length [106]. In addition, FWM can be 
effectively suppressed by optimizing channel structure [106, 107] or adopting polarization 
multiplexing [78]. In this thesis, we simply ignored FWM. 
2.5.3 Toshiba system specification and T12 protocol 
This research project is a collaboration with organizations such as Toshiba European research 
centre and BT. Toshiba provides equipment for QKD parts, so before the start of the research, 
preliminary exploration and studies on the Toshiba system has been done. 
For quantum communication systems, information is transmitted between a transmitter and a 
receiver by means of a single quantum encoded photon, such as a single photon state. Each 
photon carries a bit of information encoded on one of the properties of the photon, for instance 
its polarization, phase, or power level, known as a quantum signal. Photons can even carry 
more than one bit of information, for example, by using properties such as angular momentum 
[111]. For majority forms of quantum key distribution, Alice and Bob aim to encode quantum 
bit by using two or more non-orthogonal bases. Quantum mechanics indicates that the 
measurement of a photon by Eve, without knowing the encoding basis of each photon in 
advance, will definitely lead to a state changes for part of the photons. These changes in photon 
states will lead to errors in the bit values sent between Alice and Bob. By comparing parts of 
their original string of quantum bits, Alice and Bob can theoretically determine if Eve has 
captured the information from them. 
Toshiba has been working to optimize the architecture of the quantum access network and 
reduce the scattering of light in optical fibres, so that the number of quantum users in the dual 
feeder network reaches 128. This access network provides connectivity between multiple user 
endpoints, each of which has a traditional GPON router and a core network or metro network, 
and each GPON router has a QAN transmitter for quantum key distribution. Optical networks 
(PONs) is an economical and efficient way of connecting passive power distributors to transmit 
signals from GPON network terminals (including QAN receivers) to GPON network terminals. 





Figure2.5.3 Schematic of Toshiba QKD system 
A schematic of a Toshiba quantum communication system having a band pass filter and an 
attenuator is shown in Figure 2.5.3 which is the system utilized in this thesis. 
The upper half of the system is a transmitter, which includes a light source that generates short 
pulses of linearly polarized light that travel along the slow axis of the polarization-maintaining 
fibre. However, although in the system shown above, light travels along a slow axis, in other 
systems the light source can be coupled to the fibre, for example where light travels along a 
fast axis. The light pulse then enters an asymmetric Mach Zehnder interferometer (MZI), which 
in this case ACTS as a phase encoder encoding random critical information. 
The Mach-Zehnder Interferometer is constructed using polarization maintaining fibre. First, 
the light pulses on entering the MZI pass through a coupler that splits the incoming light pulses 
into two paths. The first path comprises a longer arm (i.e. the upper arm in the diagram) of the 
interferometer using an optical delay loop. The other shorter path comprises a phase modulator 
that encodes random key information onto the light pulse. Due to the variation in the length of 
two arms, light pulses that follow either the short path and the long path suffer a temporal 
separation ∆t. This temporal separation may be set to 
1
2
 the inverse clock rate of the QKD 
system. The pulses are then combined at a polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The PBS has the 
property that one of the input arms polarization is rotated by 90 degrees. This results in an 
output which has a polarization that can be decomposed into two orthogonal polarizations 
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separated by a short time ∆t.  The pulses are then attenuated to the single photon level using 
an optical attenuator resulting in single photon pulses and before being emitted from the 
transmitter into an optical channel which is the optical fibre in this thesis.  
The light pulse from the communication channel enters the receiver, the lower half as shown 
in the figure above. First, the pulse enters the polarization controller and is sent through PBS. 
The polarization controller is adjusted to correct any rotation of polarization that occurs during 
fibre optic transmission. This resulted in two orthogonal light pulses colliding with these 
polarizations into PBS. 
The polarization beam splitter directs the light pulse to the long or short arm of the MZI 
containing the phase modulator based on the input polarization of the light phase. The receiving 
terminal phase modulator is used to decode the random key information on the optical pulse. 
In the PBS inside the transmitter, the PBS rotation at the receiver end comes from the 
polarization of the different arms. Therefore, the two outputs have the same polarization. With 
the correct input polarization, one of the two light pulses travels along the long arm of the 
transmitter interferometer and the other along the short arm. Thus, the delay loop cancels out 
the time difference between the two light pulses ∆t, and since the two light pulses completely 
overlap, the optical interference results in the final beam-splitter. 
In the above described system function ideally, there are the following assumptions: 
(i) The two optical pulses from each arm of the decoder arrive at the same time at the 
final beam splitter; 
(ii) The optical frequency of the light source does not time vary across the optical pulse; 
(iii) The two optical pulses from each arm of the decoder arrive at the final beam splitter 
with the same intensity. 
Requirements (i) - (iii) shall be satisfied to maintain high interferometric visibility. However, 
if there is a polarization degradation mechanism in the fibre link, these requirements may not 
be fully met. Polarization degradation mechanisms include polarization rotation, polarization 
mode dispersion and polarization dependent loss. 
Each optical element in the transmitter is controlled by an electronic controller whose purpose 




2.5.4 Phase modulation scheme 
Figure 2.5.4 illustrates a fundamental Mach-Zehnder interferometer set-up. This set-up 
comprises two beam splitters and mirrors and a phase modulator.  The light is split and 
recombined by the beam splitter. Two detectors are placed at the two output ends of the 
interferometer to measure this interference. It is worth noting that any phase change between 
the transmitted beam and the reflected beam at the beam splitter is possible, but for simplicity 
we assume that the phase change is 𝜋 and 0 when the beam is reflected at the beam splitter 
along the transmission. 
Figure 2.5.4 Mach-Zehnder interferometer 
Now, different contributions to each detector are considered. Initially, we assume that the phase 
modulator are set to zero phase change to the light, 
Detector 𝐷1: For the upper path, a phase shift 𝜋 comes from the reflection first beam splitter and 
another π from the mirror, giving a total phase shift of 2𝜋. For the lower path, a phase shift π reflection 
is from the mirror. These two phase shift are out of phase and hence will add destructively resulting no 
light at Detector ‘𝐷1’.  
Detector 𝐷2: For the upper path, a phase shift 𝜋 comes from the reflection first beam splitter and 
another π from the mirror, giving a total phase shift of 2𝜋. For the lower path, a phase shift π reflection 
is from the mirror and another 𝜋  comes from the final beam splitter. These two phase shift are in phase 
and hence will add constructively interference at Detector ‘𝐷2’. 
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Providing the phase modulators 𝑃𝑀1𝑃𝑀2  apply phase shifts of 𝜋 and 0 respectively, then the 
results can be reversed which will be constructive at 𝐷1 and destructive at 𝐷2. So, changing the 
phase shifts can result in reversed output.  
This set-up was designed for conventional optical communication but also applies to single 
photon level quantum key distribution. For the BB84 and T12 protocol introduced in previous 
sections, two orthogonal bases are used. In these cases, Alice encodes bit values 0 and 1 onto 






} for the other set of basis. On the contrary, Bob will 
measure each of the photon by using either 0 phase shift for the first set of basis and 
𝜋
2
 for the 
other set. 
Input qubit 𝑷𝑴𝟏 𝑷𝑴𝟐 𝑷𝑴𝟏 − 𝑷𝑴𝟐 Output qubit 











































When the phase difference term (𝑃𝑀1 − 𝑃𝑀2) is {0 𝜋}, the outcome can be speculated and 
confirmed as shown in the table above and this occurs when both Alice and Bob use the 






}, a random result is 
obtained since there is equal probability that the photon is either measured by detector ‘𝐷1’ or 
‘𝐷2’ when incident on the final beam splitter.  
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This phase modulation scheme is for a free space system and becomes an optic-fibre-based 
phase modulation system when upper and lower paths are replaced with fibres. However, 
practical Alice and Bob are separated at least few kilometres away and such a distance is much 
longer than the theoretical two path/fibre difference. Hence, the asymmetric Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer for both Alice and Bob were proposed and improved to Toshiba system as 





The recent advancement in the field of QKD includes Mbps secure key rates [112, 113], long 
term operation [114] and the coverage of fibre length up to 260 km [6, 115]. A high bit rate 
QKD system was briefly introduced. QKD has also been realised in numerous network field 
trials [94, 97]. But QKD protocol execution involves steps such as authentication, error 
correction and privacy amplification and these are carried out on a separate public channel. 
Also, subsequent applications require support of classical data communications.  
One option is simply to use separate fibres for the quantum and classical, that is data channels. 
However, in this case, the quantum fibre does not contain any other signal traffic and is referred 
to as dark fibre. The data channel fibre need not be dark and can contain many data signals. It 
is preferable for data and quantum signals to be simultaneously transmitted through a single 
fibre. Nevertheless, to date, most experiments and field trials have been performed on dark 
fibres. As dark fibre is a scarce and expensive resource, there is a pressing need to enable the 
coexistence of QKD with data signals on the same fibre.  
Optical signals can be combined on a single optical fibre using wavelength division 
multiplexing technology utilising various wavelength of light. This technology supports bi- 
directional communication as well as boosts the information carrying capacity of an optical 
fibre [74]. White light is made up of different wavelengths and in a WDM system, at the 
transmitter side the wavelengths can be combined by using a prism or a diffraction grating type 
optical filter and sent through the optical fibre. One the receiver side, the same filters can be 
used in reverse to separate these distinct colour/wavelengths.  
Iris Choi et al have presented results from the first field trial of a quantum secured DWDM 
transmission system with real-time 10Gb/s layer-1 data encryption over installed fibre of 26 
km. Coexistence of quantum keys and up to 4 × 10Gb/s encrypted data is demonstrated over a 
single installed fibre. Secure key rate of 160 kbps has been achieved in presence of error free 
4 × 10Gb/s data. A system power margin of > 10dB for the 10Gb/s channels was maintained 
throughout the field trial providing ample margin for further capacity and reach increase. This 
also confirms the robustness and ease of implementation of QKD systems. The experimental 
results represent an important step towards mass deployment of ultra-secure high speed data 
networks employing novel quantum technologies [116].  
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K. A. Patel et al have shown that single-photon based QKD systems can be deployed in a 
DWDM environment. In these systems, temporal filtering is intrinsic to the single photon 
detectors and spectral filtering is achieved with low-cost off-the-the-shelf telecom components. 
Our QKD system allows a secure key rate of 2.38 Mb/s over 35 km fibre and a maximum 
length reach of 70 km, in the presence of error free bidirectional 10 Gb/s data. They have also 
demonstrated high bit rate QKD with the standard data laser power of 0 dBm. These positive 
results show the potential of high speed QKD for securing future communication 
infrastructures.  
In a word, QKD has huge potential and is valuable to be combined with exist infrastructure of 
classical data system even though there are still distance, secure rate, noise etc. limitations. It 
is then well worth to studying the effect of each factor on system performance and 



















Chapter 3. Characterisation for a Hybrid QKD Network 
Specifications of the quantum system and the QKD protocols which are used in this research 
have been described in Chapter 2. However the practical operation of the system can be 
affected by different internal and external factors and it is very important to target the adverse 
impact. In addition, one must optimise the system performance for future larger scale hybrid 
quantum network implementations. Thus, this chapter discusses how the secret bit rate and the 
optimized parameters are dependent on various system properties, such as detector dark count, 
transmission loss, and noises. 
3.1 Calculating the rate 
For any given protocol, there is a simple linear program that can be used with some statistics 
from Bob's data to strictly limit the maximum number of secure single-photon signals (SPS). 
Therefore, there is also a quadratic programming to determine the limit of bit error rate (BER) 
in SPS. In both cases we assume that the intensity j is clear. The length of the generated secret 
key is made up of SPS plus a dark count [117] minus the amount of information displayed 
during the error correction process, minus the amount of privacy restrictions required. The 
secret key rate formula we use in the system is very similar to the form of GLLP [3], but its 
security is actually a limited statistical derivation of Koashi's security proof [118]. For the 
numerical study reported in this work, we use: 
K = RN =  ∑ (𝑆𝑗 + 𝐷𝑗 − 𝑓𝐸𝐶 ∙ 𝐶𝑗 ∙ 𝐻2(𝐵𝐸𝑅) − 𝑓𝑃𝐴 ∙ 𝑆𝑗 ∙ 𝐻2(𝑏1
𝑚𝑎𝑥)𝑗 )         Eq (15) 
where the summation is only of the j’s that label the signals that encode secret key bits, K is 
the length of the key, R is the key rate, N is the session length measured in the number of 
signals sent, 𝑆𝑗 is the lower bound on the SPS and 𝐷𝑗 is the lower bound on the dark counts, 𝐶𝑗 
is the number of total signals that Bob received from decoy state j, 𝐻2 (·) is the binary Shannon 
entropy function and 𝑏1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is an upper bound on the bit error rate of only the SPS. Efficiency 
factors 𝑓𝐸𝐶 and 𝑓𝑃𝐴 respectively relate how close error correction and privacy amplification are 
to the Shannon limit. The simulations here use 𝑓𝐸𝐶  = 1.2 and 𝑓𝑃𝐴  = 1 +
1.53(𝑏1
𝑚𝑎𝑥)−0.54𝑆−0.44 , where S = ∑ 𝑆𝑗𝑗  is the bound on the total number of SPS contributing 
to the secret key. (The expression for 𝑓𝑃𝐴  is a rough numerical fit we have derived for 
calculating the typical number of strings needed to describe the output of a binary symmetric 
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channel with high confidence, as needed for computing privacy amplification in Koashi’s 
approach [18].) 
3.1.1 Sifting 
In the sifting step, Alice and Bob use a public channel to communicate information related to 
their measurement, in particular what basis they used to prepare or measure their qubits and at 
what times they registered a detection event. They do not disclose the measurement result. As 
it is introduced in Chapter 1, it follows that whenever Alice and Bob use the same basis, they 
should get correlated bits. The process of discarding the bits in the cases where they used 
different bases is called sifting. The ensemble of bits remaining after this basis reconciliation 
forms the sifted key. The sifted key generation rate is given by:  
𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑠𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑤                 Eq (16) 
where s is the sifting parameter, that is the fraction of bits for which the bases were the same.  
If there are no errors in the quantum cryptography system, then a potential eavesdropper, 
referred to as Eve, cannot intercept the transmission and make a measurement that will yield 
information on the quantum state of the system without causing an unavoidable back action. 
This will introduce errors in the transmission and will therefore reveal the presence of the 
eavesdropper. In this case, the sifted key is unconditionally secure. In any practical 
communication system, however, errors naturally occur due to imperfections in the individual 
components, such as the transmission line or the detectors. Errors caused by the system cannot 
be distinguished from errors due to eavesdropping. Thus, in practical systems, the statement 
that any eavesdropping will unavoidably cause errors and reveal the eavesdropping, is not a 
sufficient security proof. There is always a baseline system error rate, so we must ensure that 
some information about the quantum transmission has been leaked. Consequently, we must be 
able to put a bound on the amount of information leakage given the error rate. Practical QKD 
systems handle system errors and eavesdropping by complementing raw quantum transmission 
and sifting with two important additional steps: error correction and privacy amplification. 
Processing in both of these steps can be performed using a public channel, it does not require 




3.1.2 Error detection 
The dual purpose of the error correction step is to correct all error received bits and give an 
estimate of bit error rate. In particular, Alice gives Bob some additional information about her 
key, which will allow Bob to find and correct all the wrong bits. For example, Alice and Bob 
can group their bits into segments and check parity for each segment, optimizing the size of 
the segment as the error correction process continues. Since this information is sent over a 
public channel, error correction inevitably reveals other information to the eavesdropper. This 
information leakage must be kept as small as possible. The minimum number κ of bits that 
Alice and Bob must exchange to publicly correct their strings is a result of a central classical 
information theory, Shannon's silent encoding theorem [120]. In the case we are interested in, 
each bit of transmission is incorrect, and the error probability of each bit of transmission is e, 





=  −𝑒 log
2
𝑒 − (1 − 𝑒) log
2
(1 − 𝑒) ≡ ℎ(𝑒)                 Eq (17) 
where n is the length of the sifted key. Unfortunately, Shannon’s theorem has a non- 
constructive proof, which means that we know there exists an error correction scheme 
disclosing only κ bits but the theorem does not provide an explicit procedure for this scheme. 
An error correcting algorithm should ideally operate very close to this limit. At the same time 
the algorithm should be computationally efficient otherwise the execution time may become 
prohibitively long [62, 121].  
Error correction algorithms can usually be divided into two classes, unidirectional and 
bidirectional. In a unidirectional algorithm information flows only from Alice to Bob. Alice 
provides Bob with an additional string which he uses to try to find his errors. This makes it 
difficult to design algorithms that are both computationally efficient and operate near the 
Shannon limit [122, 123]. In a bidirectional algorithm information can flow both ways, and 
Alice can use the feedback from Bob to determine what additional information she should 
provide him, which makes it easier to approach the Shannon limit. These two error correction 
algorithms classes can be further subdivided into algorithms that discard errors and algorithms 
that correct them. Discarding errors is usually done to prevent additional side information from 
leaking to Eve. By correcting the errors, we allow for this additional flow of side information, 
which can be accounted for during privacy amplification. Since privacy amplification is 




3.1.3 Privacy amplification 
In order to interpret the information leaked in the original quantum transmission process, the 
last step of privacy amplification is to carry out in the error correction process. In privacy 
amplification, the error-corrected key is compressed into a final security key that can be 
encrypted as needed. The compression required depends on how much information have been 
possibly leaked to the eavesdropper in the previous phase of transmission [125-127]. 
For security to be useful, it must limit the amount of information leaked during quantum 
transmission and error correction, and relate it to the amount of compression that must be 
applied in privacy amplification. For the most deeply studied protocol, the BB84 protocol, the 
earliest work in this area was considered to be the simplest type of attack, known as interception 
and replay attacks [127-129]. Three types of generalized attacks have been considered: 
individual, collective, and concerted. In a single attack, the eavesdropper is limited to wrapping 
a quantum probe independently around each qubit. The probes are stored in quantum memory 
until the measurement benchmark is published, and then each probe is measured independently. 
Any measurement not prohibited by quantum mechanics is allowed. For the BB84 protocol, 
security against such attacks has been demonstrated in [46, 123, 130, 131], and these proofs 
have been extended to actual photon sources in [54]. Collective attacks are similar to individual 
attacks, but Eve can now use a quantum computer to make global measurements of all the 
probes that are considered to be a single quantum system. This enabled her to take advantage 
of the relevance introduced in the privacy amplification process of error correction and 
information exchange. Such correlations could potentially perfect the eavesdropper's quantum 
measurements. Security against collective attacks has been proven against BB84 in [132]. The 
most common type of attack is the coherent attack, in which eavesdropping treats the entire 
quantum transmission as a system entangled with a very large dimensional probe in any initial 
state. For the most general scenario, an security proof for an idea [46] [118] and an actual qubit 
source [133] have been proposed and proved. Security proof for individual, collective, or 
coordinated attacks, as well as several assumptions about the BBM92 protocols [37, 133-135] 
and B92 protocols [136], also have been conducted. 
In this work, practical quantum communication systems and network are necessary. However, 
the ability to perform collective or coherent attacks is well beyond today’s technological 
capabilities or even in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, we will restrict our discussion 
in this thesis only to individual attacks. Even these attacks assume very advanced capabilities 
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because Alice and Bob can delay the public base announcement for an arbitrarily long time, 
thus Eve is assumed to possess a quantum memory with an infinitely long coherence time, 
which is not available today. Nevertheless, general individual attacks are close to being realistic 
so it is very important to prove the security of a quantum key distribution algorithm against 
these attacks. Thus, in the following, Eve is restricted to attack individual qubits, and she is not 
allowed to perform a coherent attack consisting of collective quantum operations and 
measurements of many qubits with quantum computers. This not only corresponds to a realistic 
scenario but it also makes the mathematical treatment of the problems we will consider simpler 
and more intuitive.  
The role of the privacy amplification step is to deduce the shrinking factor τ by which the error 
corrected key has to be compressed, given the error rate calculated in the error correction step 
and the bound on the amount of information leaked during the previous phases of the 
transmission, so that Eve’s information about the final key is lower than a specified value. This 
calculation is performed using the methods of the generalized privacy amplification theory 
[137], which makes the worst case assumption that all errors are potentially caused by 
eavesdropping. The result of this theory states that the length of the final key should be set to 
[137]: 
r = nτ − k − t                 Eq (18) 
where n is the length of the sifted key, k is the number of bits disclosed during error correction, 




                      Eq (19) 
In the above expression, pc is the average collision probability, an important quantity in the 
analysis of privacy amplification, which is a measure of Eve’s mutual information with Alice 
and Bob.  
Instead of the length of the final secure key given above, it is more useful to calculate the 
normalized communication rate in units of bits/s. 
 If N is the length of the transmission, then n = N𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑑 , and the communication rate, or else 













)                  Eq (20) 
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However, an algorithm that is computationally feasible and works at this ideal limit does not 
exist. All practical algorithms are inefficient to some extent, and this is accounted for by 
introducing a function f(e), defined as the ratio of the algorithm performance to that of the 





=  −𝑓(𝑒)[𝑒 log
2
𝑒 + (1 − 𝑒) log
2
(1 − 𝑒)] = 𝑓(𝑒)ℎ(𝑒)        Eq (21) 
Combining the above, the final expression for the secure key generation rate is, 
R = 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑑  {𝜏 + 𝑓(𝑒)[𝑒 log2 𝑒 + (1 − 𝑒) log2(1 − 𝑒)]}                          Eq (22) 
where 𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑑  and τ depend on the QKD protocol and system parameters.  
3.2 Detector characterisation  
3.2.1 Performance parameters of an APD 
Here, the key figures of merit for APDs are summarised. 
Single photon detection efficiency: The single photon detection efficiency is defined as the 
probability of detection given that a photon is incident on the device [138-140]. 
Dark count probability: The dark count probability is defined as the probability of detection 
in the absence of a photon. Dark counts in semiconductor devices are stimulated by defects. 
Dark counts can derive from either thermally or tunnelling generated carriers. In the case of 
thermal generation, the carriers move from valence band to conduction band either directly or 
via a defect state due to thermal excitation. On the other hand, tunnelling generation is due to 
carrier tunnelling from either valence band to conduction band or defect to conduction band 
[141]. The dark count probability 𝑃𝐷 is directly proportional to the temperature, T, and given 
by [142, 143]: 







                                   Eq (23) 
where 𝑛𝑖 is the APD material intrinsic carrier density, 𝜏𝑒 is the effective lifetime of the carriers, 
𝐸𝛼(𝑇) is the carrier thermal activation energy and k is the Boltzmann constant. From the 
equation above, the dark count level can be controlled by tuning the temperature T of the device. 
The APDs are thermoelectrically cooled to -30°C and the source of dark counts is pre-
dominantly due to thermal generation of carriers. 
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After-pulsing: After-pulsing is the creation of false counts that arise from the emission of 
carriers, which are trapped in the multiplication region during a previous detection event. 
During the avalanche development in an APD, carriers generated can be trapped in defects 
within the bandgap. These defects (energy states) in the semiconductor can be classified as 
donor states for electron defects (or traps) and acceptor states for hole defects (or traps), as 
shown in Figure 3.2.1.1. As this process is thermal, the timescales for de-population are long, 
which prevents the operation of the APDs at high frequencies. After-pulsing, P𝐴 , can be 









                       Eq (24) 
where 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑎is the avalanche probability, 𝑁𝑓𝑡  is the number of filled traps, 𝜏𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝 the de-trapping 








                                   Eq (25) 
where 𝜎 is the trapping cross section, 𝜈 is the average thermal velocity of carriers (𝜈 ∝ 𝑇1/2), 
N is the effective density of states (𝑁 ∝ 𝑇3/2), and 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝 is the activation energy of the traps. 
As a result, the de-trapping time 𝜏𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝 is inversely proportional to T
2 and hence at lower T the 
detrapping lifetime increases as does the after-pulse rate. 
 
Figure 3.2.1.1 Schematic of Band energy diagram including the trap energy states 
On the other hand, dark counts decrease with temperature. Hence, there is a trade-off when 
optimising the operating temperature of the device. As is the case of dark counts, afterpulsing 
depends on the defect concentration in the material. So in order to reduce afterpulsing, the 
 
 58 
material quality should be improved or the carriers flowing through the device should be 
minimised using suitable quenching circuits. 
Timing jitter: This is the uncertainty in the detection time of a photon impinging on the device. 
It usually stems from the avalanche noise due to the APD avalanche process [146, 147].  
Dead time: This is usually regarded as the time after a photon detection event during which the 
detector is unable to register a count [148].  
3.2.2 Impact of the dark count effect in QKD 
The dark count rate varies with the material used for the detector. Detectors for 
telecommunication wavelengths are typically based on germanium and InGaAs/InP. These 
materials do suffer from high levels of impurities due to the crystal growth process. That said, 
APDs should be operated at lower temperatures so as to reduce dark counts caused by thermal 
excitations. However, too low a temperature might lead to higher after-pulsing probability 
because cooling slows the rate at which the traps release the charge carriers [149, 150]. 
The inefficient dark counts of the detector will also affect the security of the QKD system. Eve 
may use this imperfection to cover the error she introduces from her measurement of the single 
photon state. In other words, the key problem here is that Bob does not know whether his 
detection events arise from: single photon detection, multi photon detection, or dark counts. as 
a “scope” telling Alice and Bob which state comes from single photon, multi photon or dark 
count [151]. 
The performance of a single-photon detector on QKD should be evaluated by use of a quantum-
bit-error rate (QBER) introduced in Chapter 1, given by [151, 152]， 












where 𝑃𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘, 𝑃𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡, and 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 are the probabilities of getting a dark count, of detecting a photon, 
and that a photon went to an erroneous detector, respectively. 𝜇  is the probability that an 
emitted pulse will contain at least one photon. 𝜂𝑡 is the transfer efficiency from a sender to a 
detector, and 𝜂𝑑  is the quantum efficiency of the detector. The QBER that is due to the 
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imperfect single-photon detection is given by the ratio of the dark-count probability per gate, 
𝑃𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘, to the quantum efficiency of a detector, hd. The transmission distance is limited by the 
condition that the QBER is below 15% (for a different assumption of the eavesdropper’s ability, 
the QBER must be below 11.5%) [152]. Therefore the maximum transmission distance is 
obtained when 𝑃𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘/𝜂𝑑 is minimum.  
Here we assume that the effect of afterpulses is negligible. The probability that a photon goes 





                                              Eq (26) 
where 𝑉𝑐 is the fringe visibility of an interferometer used for QKD [153]. Transfer efficiency 
𝜂𝑡 is given by  
η𝑡 =  10
−(𝐿𝑓𝑙+𝐿𝑟)/10                                  Eq (27) 
where 𝐿𝑓 is losses in the fibre, in decibels per kilometre, 𝑙  is the transmission distance, in 
kilometers, and 𝐿𝑟 are internal losses in the receiver system, in decibels. Then the maximum 
transmission distance 𝑙 is given by [77] 












}              Eq (28) 
And this equation is used for distance prediction in the following chapters. 
3.3 Noise characterisation 
Due to photon–phonon interactions, photons can change their wavelength and thus compromise 
other channels. Depending on whether a phonon gets excited or de-exited, photons at 
wavelengths above (Stokes) and below (anti-Stokes) the initial wavelength are generated. 
Scattering off acoustic phonons (Brillouin scattering) is not critical, since the maximal 
frequency shift of the scattered photons is small (10GHz, in the backward direction) and 
therefore cannot reach adjacent channels on a 100 GHz grid. By contrast, scattering off optical 
phonons (Raman scattering) can lead to significant frequency shifts covering the entire C-
band[103], having an intensity maximum at a shift of about 13 THz (corresponding to a 
wavelength shift of 100 nm at 1550 nm). Different from acoustic phonons, the more or less flat 
dispersion relationship of optical phonons results in frequency shifts independent of the 
scattering direction. This means that a wide spectrum of photons can be produced in both the 
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co-propagation direction and the counter-propagation direction (as opposed to the excitation 
signal). 
As discussed in the previous chapters, transferring quantum and classical data is less costly and 
efficient. To execute this process correctly, Bob and Alice need to synchronize; This can be 
done by sending strong pulses of light between them. In order to optimize resource utilization, 
these classical channels should share the transmission fibre with QKD photon. In addition, 
from the perspective of optical networking, it is very practical to combine QKD with classical 
WDM optical channels [154]. Some photons in the classical channel can be spontaneously 
inelastic Raman scattering into the quantum channel bandwidth. This effect is characterized by 
bandwidth, which is proportional to the total power of the traditional channel and depends on 
the length of the fibre link. Another noise mechanism involves Rayleigh backscattering of the 
quantum channel itself. Since QKD involves the detection of a single photon, very sensitive 
detectors are required [115], and any background light in the fibre increases the noise level of 
the system and limits its performance. 
Based on the model in [41] [39], the effect of spontaneous Raman scattering (SRS) generated 
by classical flow on the QKD system is analysed. This model is applied to the BB84 system 
with a weak laser source with a decoy state. This means that the strength of the quantum source 
is assumed to vary randomly to test whether the channel is disturbed by eavesdropping. It 
allows longer distances to be reached and analyses the results in a safe key-rate value, bounded 
below the model. Here we conservatively assume the use of infinite deceptions, and the 
analysis depends on the average number of photons emitted per time interval, channel losses, 
in-band generation of SRS, and the efficiency of the detection equipment. 
The channel transmittance between Alice and Bob depends on the fibre length L, which is 
determined by [41] 
η = exp (−αL) × 𝜂𝑏𝑜𝑏𝜂𝑆𝑃𝐷                              Eq (29) 
where α is the fiber attenuation coefficient at the quantum channel [ 𝑘𝑚−1 ], 𝜂𝑏𝑜𝑏 is the 
transmittance of Bob's equipment and 𝜂𝑆𝑃𝐷 is the SPD detection efficiency. The yield of a 
number state containing n photons, defined as the conditional probability of a detection event 
at Bob’s side given that Alice sends out an n-photon state, can be written, for small values 𝜂𝑌0, 
as [41] 
𝑌𝑛  ≈  𝑌0 + 1 − (1 − 𝜂)
𝑛                                    Eq (30) 
where the yield for vacuum state (𝑌0) is the system noise, composed by the SRS noise and the 
dark counts of the SPDs. For a BB84 system with two SPDs [1], 𝑌0 = 2𝑃𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘 +  𝜅𝑃𝑠𝑟𝑠, i.e., 
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twice the dark count probability ( Pdark) of one detector, and the unpolarized SRS noise is 
assumed to be split between the two devices. The factor κ depends on the modulation format 
assumed for the telecom traffic and is related to its duty cycle. For phase shift-keying-based 




The PSK-based format family represents the worst case, when the intensity of the parallel 
traffic is continuous in time, while in the RZ-OOK, half the bits are zero and the bits occupy 
half of each bit slot, which results in a smaller average optical power and a reduction of the 
SRS. 
A laser source can be approximated to a weak coherent state, which exhibit Poisson distribution 
of the number of photons n per time interval, i.e., 𝑃(𝑛|𝜇) = exp(−𝜇) 𝜇𝑛/𝑛!, given an average 
number of photons in each interval. The channel gain Q is composed by the sum over the gain 
values for each photon-number state, i.e. the probability that Bob yields a detection event given 
that Alice has sent an n-photon pulse [41], 
𝑄 = ∑ 𝑌𝑛
∞
𝑛=0 𝑃(𝑛|𝜇) = 𝑌0 + 1 − exp (−𝜇𝜂)                          Eq (31) 
Since each vacuum yield can randomly generate a count in any detector, the associated 
quantum bit error rate (QBER) is 
1
2
. Furthermore, misalignment of the optical components (𝛾) 
can bring non-vacuum states to cause erroneous detection. The overall QBER can be calculated 
by summing over the contribution of each photon-number state relative to the overall gain [41], 
i.e., 





                                                     Eq (32) 
The lower bound for the final secure key rate is finally written as [41] 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑅) >
1
2





)] − 𝑄𝑓(𝐸)𝐻2(𝐸)}               Eq (33) 
and depends on the single-photon gain 𝑄1  and the Shannon entropy of the error 𝐻2(𝐸). A 
quantum error correction inefficiency factor 𝑓(𝐸) is usually considered, which reduces the 




3.4 Hybrid system specification 
For an original BB84 protocol, the coding scheme was designed to develop the quantum 
properties of any single photon polarization states, however phase coding schemes can also be 
realized [78]. These coding schemes are based on the properties of interferometers and the 
coding is implemented by changing the relative optical path lengths or phase between the 
internal arms of the interferometer which is referred to Toshiba instrument and will be 
introduced in Chapter 4.  
The commercial QKD system used in this study comes from a Toshiba device shown in Figure 
3.4.1 that reached an advanced level of secure key rate. Essentially, the way to use this in high 
data rate transmission is to use Toshiba transmitter and receiver (i.e. Alice and Bob), in this 
case. These series of Alice of Bob are used to generate key pairs and take the key pairs out of 
them and input them into the line card. These are 100 gigabit polarization multiplexed 
quadrature phase shift keying (PolMux QPSK) standard transmission systems encrypted with 
AES 256. 
Figure 3.4.1 Toshiba Alice/Bob device 
Typically, AES 256 encryption is derived from both ends using the standard Diffie-Hellman 
technique. But in this case, instead of using Diffie-Hellman and the current standard method, 
this study provides the feeding QKD signal directly from the QKD system. In the thesis, as 
shown in the figure below, two wavelengths were injected into Alice. And then it combines 
with other wavelengths, like QKD. And then on the far side, they get de-multiplexed again. 
In this study, wavelength at 1530 nm is allocated for the classical wavelengths and 1550 nm 
for the QKD wavelengths. And due to fairly careful frequency and time domain filtering in the 




Figure 3.4.2 QKD with gigabit data line card 
Figure 3.4.2 illustrated one of the links where one pair of Alice and Bob locate in this study. 
Data at different wavelengths including gigabits QPSK classical data at high power level and 
QKD keys data are transmitted straight across the three-node Cambridge quantum network 
without any need to regeneration. 
 
Figure 3.4.3 Laboratory view of hybrid system 
We note that network key management QKD was developed by Peev et al. [90], Sasaki et al. 
[94], and Stucki et al [115]. However, in this study we used Tanizawa et al. [155], a recent 
design which features major advantages than other network key management architectures, 
















Figure 3.4.4 shows the basic idea of the network key delivery layer, or key management. 
Assume that each node is trusted and can generate a "global key" buffer that is shared with 
peers using a one-time encryption (OTP) tunnel encrypted based upon the QKD key. In this 
way, the global key is quantum secure and can be used by an application through a dedicated 
application interface (API) based on representational state transfer (REST). 
As a sample application, we used two pairs of ADVA FSP3000 racks (figure 3.4.3) installed 
on the CAPE-TREL link with a classic ADVA 100G cryptographic line card. Due to the 
bidirectional nature of the line cards, each card has an AES encryptor in one direction and an 
AES decryptor in the opposite direction. Each pair of line cards requests a global key from its 
local node approximately every 4 seconds, in other word, QKD links provide a global key 
every 2 seconds on average (because there are two pairs of line CARDS). The global key 
replaces the normal AES key normally used to encrypt 100G of data traffic. It has been 
calculated that the key refresh rate of a global key every 4 seconds is equivalent to the (global) 
bit rate of about 100 BPS. The current key exchange frequency is not limited by the AES 
hardware, but by the speed of the REST API, which passes each key from the QKD device to 
the AES engine separately. Acceleration can be achieved, for example, by transferring multiple 
keys and optimizing the protocol runtime. Note: the standard c-band transmission system 
design allows a fully loaded system to work by collecting QKD keys in parallel without any 
further changes. 
 





Chapter 3 presented the characterisation of a hybrid QKD network. Firstly several key rates in a 
QKD system have been derived. Because a single photon is highly susceptible to noise hence 
the influence and noise analysis of the single photon receiver in the system are discussed. In 
addition, it has introduced the noise likely generated in the hybrid system including Raman 
noise from high optical classical channel. The specification of the three-node ring QKD 















Chapter 4. Hybrid QKD system performance of field trial and 
laboratory fibre reels 
The previous chapters introduce the research background and related fundamental knowledge 
of this thesis such as early quantum key distribution protocol BB84. Chapter 4 describes the 
establishment of a preliminary model of the quantum network in Cambridge and the United 
Kingdom, followed by a point-to-point field trial. In addition, the comparison between the 
system built in the laboratory and the trial system shows that the hybrid communication system 
can reach the current maximum speed and high stability of the same fibre length in the actual 
QKD encryption communication process. 
4.1 Motivation 
The communication of optical fibre network is an important part of modern society. Social 
activities, from everyday life such as social software to public security such as banking systems, 
are increasingly linked to fibre-optic communications. As the importance of these networks 
grows, it needs to secure information between them to ensure that users can identify from each 
other and the data is secure so that data cannot be intercepted or eavesdropped. Quantum key 
distribution has been proved to be able to secure data not only to improve the security of today's 
communications systems [25, 132] but also to be able to cope with future eavesdropping 
techniques after the advent of quantum computers. 
However, there are several challenges to developing a practical QKD system from a laboratory 
to the real world. Due to changes in environmental conditions and physical stresses, the 
installed fibre is always subject to stronger perturbations, which in turn cause perturbations of 
the transmitted quantum state. Installed fibre also suffer higher losses due to splicing, sharp 
bends, and inter-fibre coupling. The software and hardware of the QKD device must not only 
be designed to cope with all the conditions affecting the transmission fibre, but must also 
operate in the premises designed for standard telecommunications equipment. In addition, 
because systems should run continuously, they should also be designed to automatically 
recover from errors and protect end users from service outages. 
The equipment required for the generation and reception of cryptography quantum state is 
designed and provided by Toshiba. The basic principles of the instrument have been introduced 
in the previous chapters. Using this equipment to carry out experimental analysis and actual 
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network construction from the most basic point-to-point model of the network is the premise 
of building a larger and more complex network in the future. 
4.2 System theoretical limitations 
4.2.1 Ideal and Poisson source performance 
As described in the previous chapter, QKD is based on the production of a single photon. 
Unfortunately, all recent experiments are, in principle, unsafe due to real-life imperfections 
[39]. However, in the QKD system, the highly attenuated laser is often used as the source of 
single-photon generation. However, these sources sometimes produce signals that contain 
more than one photon. Multiphoton signals open the door to powerful new eavesdropping 
attacks, including photonic fission attacks. For example, Eve in principle can measure the 
number of photons per signal sent by Alice and selectively suppress the single photon signal. 
She separated the multi-photon signals, kept one for herself, and sent one to Bob. Now, because 
Eve has the same copy as Bob, the unconditional security in QKD [for example, the standard 
BB84 protocol [58] is completely compromised. To sum up, in the standard BB84 protocol, 
only the signal from the single photon pulse emitted by Alice is guaranteed to be secure. 
 
Figure 4.2.1(a) Theoretical simulation of BB84 protocol performance  




 Figure 4.2.1 (b) Theoretical QBER of BB84 protocol performance  
with perfect and Poisson source 
Theoretical plots of ideal single photon source and attenuated laser source, which is Poisson 
source, are shown in figure 4.2.1 plotted by Matlab. Here, the communication length limit of 
the ideal single-photon light source system is about 130 km when only fibre loss is considered. 
Although the quantum bit error rate is only 5%, the secure key rate is less than 100 bit per 
second which is hardly possible to be utilized in real system. When using a Poisson light source, 
the system can only work up to few kilometres.  
The parameters are as follows and works on the simulation of idea source and Poisson source. 
Wavelength 1550nm 
Channel loss 0.21 dB/km 
Transmittance on Bob side 0.1 
Error detection probability 0.03 
Count probability for vacuum pulse 2e-5 
Laser pulse repetition rate 2e6 
Average photon number of signal states 0.1 
Error rate of vacuum state 0.5 
Reconciliation factor of BB84 0.5 




4.2.2 Decoy state QKD 
The decoy-state quantum key distribution protocol (QKD) is the most widely used QKD 
scheme based on the basic BB84 protocol. Compared with the standard BB84 protocol, the 
actual QKD systems use multiple photon sources, which makes them vulnerable to photon 
number division (PNS) attacks. This will greatly limit the actual QKD system's secure 
transmission rate or maximum channel length. Using decoy technique [156], this basic 
weakness of the actual QKD system is generated by the use of multiple transmitter sources of 
intensity levels, i.e., qubits are randomly selected through the Alice intensity level (a signal 
state and several states of decoy), resulting in different photon counts for the entire channel. At 
the end of the transmission, Alice publicly announces which intensity level was used for each 
qubit transmission. A successful PNS attack needs to maintain the bit error rate (BER) at the 
receiver end, which cannot be achieved by multi-photon counts. By monitoring BERs 
associated with each intensity level, the two legitimate parties will be able to detect PNS attacks 
with a highly increased security transmission rate or maximum channel length, making the 
QKD system suitable for practical use. Figure 4.2.2 shows the simulation performance of the 
decoy state protocol, which can increase the transmission length to 100 km. However, the 
security key rate of tens of thousands of bits/second is still relatively low for the actual quantum 
network link application. 








Channel loss 0.21 dB/km 
Transmittance on Bob side 0.045 
Error detection probability 0.033 
Count probability for vacuum pulse 1.7e-6 
Laser pulse repetition rate 2e6 
1 decoy state average photon number  0.12 
2 decoy state average number 1st/2nd decoy  0.05/0 
Average photon number of signal  
1 decoy state 




Table 4.2.2  Specifications of decoy state simulations 
 
4.2.3 Cambridge quantum network 
TREL have investigated the finite-size security of the efficient version of the decoy-state BB84 
protocol, implemented with an attenuated laser and a decoy state technique called the T12 
protocol which has advantages over the classical BB84 protocol and decoy state protocol 
discussed in previous chapters [42]. T12 Protocol is implemented by Toshiba's QKD device 
and continued to be applied in the following studies. 
 
Figure 4.2.3. T12-protocol secure key rate vs distance simulation result 
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The secure key rate on a logarithmic scale as a function of the length of the optic fibre is plotted 
in Figure 4.2.3. The security key rate reduces exponentially as the fibre length increases and 
the trend is the same as standard BB84 and decoy state protocols. The exponentially reduce is 
because of the scattering in the optical fibre and loss of the standard optical fibre at 1550nm is 
0.2 dB/km. Such attenuation is caused by the properties of the fibre and is often difficult to 
change. Some lower loss, such as 0.18 dB/km or 0.16 dB/km, can be used, but considering the 
cost and other factors, ordinary single-mode fibre are more widely used. In other words, an 
increase of 50km in the length of the fibre reduces the secure key rate by about a tenth. 
All the above protocol simulations are theoretical results, and no additional several Gbps 
signals are combined with. In real communication systems, QKD aims to encrypt 100 Gbps 
classical data and both are transmitted through the same fibre. Hence noisy photons will 
weaken the theoretical limitations and are discussed in the following.  
Wavelength 1550nm 
Channel loss 0.21 dB/km 
Dark count rate 2*5.9E-5 
After pulse rate 0.0282 
Bob efficiency 0.25 
Average photon number of signal  0.42 
Decoy average photon number of signal  0.042 
Transmittance on Bob side  0.05 
Error detection probability  0.031 
Laser pulse repetition rate 1.036e9 
Error rate of a vacuum state 0.5 




4.3 System experimental limitations 
4.3.1 10 Gbps classical data 
Figure 4.3.1 (a) shows the experiment setup to generate a 10 Gbps classical data. The traditional 
communication signals in the dotted box are pre-tested and calibrated before being fed into the 
transmitter, Alice.  
Figure 4.3.1(a)Diagram of adding external polarization controller 
First, connect each instrument according to the figure above. The laser is selected for 1531nm 
with power less than -10 dBm to meet the requirements of the Toshiba system. The modulation 
mode is phase modulation and then VOA is used to protect the optical path. Two amplifiers 
are used in this optic circuit, where the pre-amplifier is an electronic-amplifier to match the 
signal power of the Pulse Pattern Generator (PPG) inject to the modulator, and the post-
amplifier is an optical-amplifier aims to amplify the signal to monitor the error of the received 
signal.  




In telecommunications, the eye diagram is an oscilloscope display in which the digital signal 
from the receiver is repeatedly sampled and applied to the vertical input, while the data rate is 
used to trigger the horizontal scan. It is a tool to evaluate the effect of channel noise and inter-
symbol interference on the performance of baseband pulse transmission system. In the eye 
diagram, the greater the vertical opening of the eye, the clearer the edge, indicating that the 
received signal is more consistent with the original signal [157].  
Remove Alice and Bob in the figure above and connect directly to different lengths of fibre 
reel. Changing the power of the incident laser, observe the changes of the eye diagram and the 
bit error rate. As a result, the data rate is set to be 10Gbps and the link is able to operate up to 
25km (error free BER < 10−12) and the power launches into fibre is up to −8 𝑑𝐵𝑚. However, 
since the input signal to Alice should not be greater than −10 𝑑𝐵𝑚, the optical signal is set to 
attenuate to −10.2 𝑑𝐵𝑚 before being sent to Alice, resulting in the bit error rate rising to 10−9. 
4.3.2 Commercial 10/100 Gbps classical data 
In the actual communication process, besides ensuring low bit error rate, factors such as input 
signal power should be considered as well. Therefore, the above mentioned light path is 
difficult to be used in long-distance and high input power trial systems. In the following 
research, a set of commercial equipment ADVA is adopted. A pair of ADVA 10G classical 
encryption line cards are installed in two ADVA FSP3000 shelves and connected as shown in 
Figure 4.3.2 (a). 
 
Figure 4.3.2 (a) Commercial classical data link test 
As shown above, the transmitter is connected to a variable optical attenuator and then directly 
to the receiver. Change incident light power and record bit error rate. The attenuator is 
connected to a 15.6km optical fibre coil (~ 3.8dB loss), and then change the incident light 
power and record the corresponding bit error rate. And then replace the fibre with longer length 




Figure 4.3.2 (b) performance of commercial sets 
Figure 4.3.2(b) shows the plot of bit error rate as a function of fibre input power. For fibre with 
different length, the bit error rate decreases with the increase of incident power and is linearly 
proportional. The system is able to provide error free (BER < 10−12) transmission through 
optical fibre length up to 75km without forward error correction. And the length can be 
extended to 100km with forward error correction. 
4.4 Cambridge quantum network trial performance 
In this study, the QKD link is shown in figure 4.4 (a). The network consists of a number of 
different transceiver nodes, including those of the advanced photonic electronics centre 
(CAPE), TREL and the engineering department (ENG) of the university of Cambridge. The 
optical fibre distance (loss) is 10.44 km (3.9 dB) [CAPE – TREL], 9.64 km (4.2dB) [TREL–
ENGI] and 4.9 km (~2.5dB) [ENGI–CAPE]. The average fibre loss coefficient of all three links 
is 0.43dB/km, which is very similar to the dark fibre three-link quantum network demonstrated 
earlier [5]. There is a loopback link between CAPE and Duxford, which can test the link length 
up to 66km, with an overall link loss of 16dB and a dispersion of 1012ps/nm. 
A long term field trial has been carried out over this network, for around 550 days, other tests 
have induced transmitting data from the electrical engineering building, to Toshiba labs, back 
to engineering, and finally back to the electrical engineering building.  
Increase the input power to when the BER is smaller
than 1E-9， the system only shows 0 hence there
shows no scatter point in the figure
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Figure 4.4 (a) The Cambridge Quantum Network Infrastructure 
For simplicity, Figure 4.4(b) demonstrates the network structure both the QKD and classical 
data links. Each of these links has been a separate QKD node. There has been an Alice and a 
Bob up on each of the three links shown on the left. In addition, QKD links operate also in the 
presence of 200 gigabits of classical data, which are encoded and encrypted via the QKD and 
send high speed classical data through the whole network. 
 
 




Figure 4.4 (c) long-term trial results of QBER within Cambridge QKD network 
The results of the month-long experiment are shown in figure 4.4 (c) and figure 4.4 (d). The 
values of QBER maintains below 5% during the time. One of the links, Link 1 from CAPE to 
Toshiba laboratory, is showing a rather larger variation in QBER than the others. As it is 
described in figure 4.4(b), the way that the system is operating is to co-propagate QKD and 
high speed data along the same fibre. In other word, that is the highest intensity light, so that 
will suffer most degradation from scattering, from Raman and coupling as well which has been 
introduced in previous sections and will be discussed in details in Chapter 6.  
Figure 4.4 (d) long-term trial results of secure key rate of QKD network performance 
Clearly, the network results in sustained key rates of the order of megabits per second and 
Figure 4.4 (e)shows the results in terms of the cumulative distribution functions which gives a 
better way demonstrating the fastest link at the same distance compared to many other 
systems[93, 97] due to the benefit of T12 protocol. 
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Figure 4.4 (e) Secure key rate in terms of Cumulative Distribution Function 
The 33km and 66km fibre link are shown in Figure 4.4(f). For the 33km route, only quantum 
data enters from TREL unidirectional along the TREL-Dux route through CAPE, then arrives 
at Dux and re-enters a reverse independent channel to reach CAPE. The Alice was put at TREL 
and Bob was at CAPE. The quantum power level at TREL is 8.9 dB  higher than that at Dux 
end to compensate the optic loss between TREL and Dux ends. As a consequence, the quantum 
signal injected at Dux end would be at the target power level (𝑃𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚) and then transmitted 
through a 33km link to CAPE.  
And for the 66km link, The one-way length of CAPE and Dux is 33km, so a 66km transmission 
route directly inputs light from the CAPE end along one optical fibre to reach Dux and then to 
another reverse optical fibre to return to CAPE. Additionally, there has been sent a 100 gigabits 
classical channels down that, as well as running the QKD on it. And the power of the classical 
data is set to be -10 dBm at which it will always remain error free. 
   



































Experimental QBER results from the longer QKD system are illustrated in Figure 4.4 (g). The 
66km link experimental QBER results greatly differ from simulation results (i.e. below 3.5% 
shown in Figure 4.4(f)). This is because the 66-kilometre-link operates with quite significant 
input classical powers, there exists a finite amount of coupling from the Raman scatter from 
the classical channels into the quantum channel. And also, QBER goes up to 6.5% from 3.3% 
due to 15dBs fibre loss. 
 
 





4.5  Discussion  
4.5.1 Hybrid quantum network 
The Cambridge quantum network has been fully functional quantum network running on 
optical fibres result in a secure key rate of Mbps. These high key rates are compatible with 
metropolitan architectures of dozens of nodes. For AES encryption, users can expect 100Gbps 
of data bandwidth and ~1Hz of AES quantum key refresh rate -- working in the same fibre as 
QKD. The quantum key rate reported here is enough to support thousands of users, which is 
enough for most major cities. For example, in the overall three-tier network model, we might 
expect each node in the Cambridge quantum network to support several quantum access 
networks (QAN) [159] [93] to serve the area of the city around the node. QANs has been 
proven to handle converged bandwidth of up to hundreds of kbps [160], so a few QANs on 
each metro node are ideal for this metropolitan network. Consider a situation where each QAN 
user communicates with another QAN user only through the Cambridge quantum network. 
Then, the average bandwidth per user is   
𝐵~2𝑅/𝑛 
Where n is the total number of users of each node. For each user's actual bandwidth (or bit rate) 
(which can support AES key exchange) > 100 bps . The Cambridge quantum metro network, 
showing QKD links to 2.5Mbps speeds that can support about 100,000 users, which is related 
to the population of Cambridge. Therefore, the results show that this quantum link can work in 
most metropolitan environments. 
4.5.2 Comparison between theoretical and experimental results 
Figure 4.6.1(a) demonstrate the sifted and secure bit rate as a function of fibre length simulated 
by Matlab. The sifted key rate drops down exponentially with the fibre length, and the 
attenuation rate is about 0.2 dB/km, which is the characteristic loss of the single mode fibre. 
For short fibre distances (less than 50 km), the security key rate decreases at the same rate. 
Figure 4.6.1 (b) shows the experimental results of QBER(symbol) as a function of the fibre 
reel length. Short fibre length, usually smaller than 50 km results in little changes in QBER. 
When the length of the fibre is greater than 50km, the QBER gradually increases, because the 
dark count and Raman contribution are no longer insignificant compared to the signal count. 
To make it clearer of the contribution of Raman noise, a simulation diagram of QBER without 
data laser (dotted line) in figure 4.6.1(b) is shown.   
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Using only the parameters measured experimentally, the simulated the security key rate and 
QBER are shown in the solid lines in figure below. Both forward and backward Raman 
scattering have been taken into account. In addition, additional losses due to optical fibre 
connectors and optical fibre dispersion have been considered. At 90 km, the connector makes 
up for an additional 0.6 dB loss, while fibre dispersion adds 1 dB penalty to the data channel. 
The simulation results are in good agreement with the experimental results. 
 Figure 4.5.1 Secure key rate (up) and QBER (down) versus fibre length [116] 
The plot above could be utilized as a roughly calculation for the relationship between secure 
key rate and QBER for short transmission length. Here two sets of points are taken, that is, 
secure key rate and QBER at length of 35km 50km. 





106 − 6 × 105
4% − 2.5%
= 2.6 × 107 
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Where the gradient is very close to the value 2 × 107 in Figure 4.6.2 which shows the data 
from Cambridge network. 
In the Toshiba system, the number of pulses containing a single photon is a random variable, 
and the generation and measurement of photons is a random process. At the same time, the 
Toshiba system, after generating and storing keys, will evaluate a large cluster of keys and 
eventually calculates an quantum bit error rate. When we do a lot of replications on a lot of 
random variables, the distributions of these variables add up to very close to a Gaussian 
distribution. Therefore, based on the random generation of photons, the random process of light 
pulse contains a single photon, the QBER that measures the photon phase randomly and 
estimate the QBER based upon thousands of randomized process, the QBER then should obey 
a Gaussian distribution. During the trial duration, the statistics of the QBER have been found 
to be Gaussian distributed with a standard deviation of 0.5. The results of the field trial suggest 
that the system works stably and has considerable potential for applications in metropolitan 
networks.  




4.6 Summary  
Chapter 4 estimates the theoretical limitation of QKD system in terms of both transmission 
distance and key generated rate. Laboratory experiments on the Gbps data link secured by QKD 
have been then conducted through fibre reels and compared with long-term field trials within 
Cambridge quantum network.   
These long-term results from the quantum layer of the Cambridge metro network are 
comparable to recent long-term network demonstration, which is the Swiss quantum network 
[5] introduced in previous chapter. The network consists of three metropolitan length links, 
with an operating time of about 2 years. Cambridge quantum network produced 129 terabits of 
key materials, so it is about three orders of magnitude larger than Swiss quantum network. The 
security key material of the three links amounts to 360 Terabit. In conclusion, this Chapter puts 
forward the view that the system can run stably in the laboratory and report application of the 















Chapter 5. Investigation on system operation temperature effect 
Having compared the experimental and trial QKD network system performance in Chapter 4, 
it is worth nothing that the trial results indicate a relationship between temperature and secure 
key rate. Hence in this chapter, the cause of the transmission and detection performance of the 
QKD network is discussed. Theoretical and experimental studies are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
5.1 Motivation 
Quantum key distribution allows the distribution of secret digital keys through optical fibres, 
and its security depends on the laws of quantum physics [2, 44] [25, 32, 98]. The measurement 
of the quantum state used by third parties to carry the key bit can lead to state coding errors, 
allowing legitimate users to detect any eavesdropping attempt. QKD has been proven to 
achieve Mbit/s security key rates (such as Dixon[42, 112]) and communication distances of up 
to hundreds of kilometres. In Chapter 4, a QKD network is reported, which proves the 
practicability of QKD by multiplexing with traditional data signals. Recent research has also 
focused on multi-user access networks, or the development of advanced protocols to improve 
security and efficiency [43, 45]. 
One of the key components of a QKD system is a single-photon detector, usually a single-
photon avalanche detector. Of course, the passive quenching operation of the InGaAs/InP 
single-photon avalanche diode detector at low excess bias, including post-pulse analysis, has 
been discussed in the previous section. Although in the traditional DV-QKD system, the 
original BB84 encoding scheme [32]was designed to take advantage of the quantum properties 
of the single-photon polarization state [52], the experimental equipment relies on the 
measurement of the phase encoding state. These encoding schemes, including the T12 protocol 
[42] used in this study, rely on interferometers, and encoding is achieved by changing the 
relative optical path length or phase between the arms of the interferometer. Of course, in a 
real transmission environment, temperature or polarization changes may occur unpredictably 
and affect performance [56, 161]. 
Gigabits/s high speed classical communication systems encrypted by quantum key distribution 
are sensitive to crosstalk due to signal photons arriving at the detector end which weaken 
systematic security level causing low secure key rate and a large of quantum bit error rate. 
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Therefore, it is important to determine the reasons and factors that the affect system 
performance described in Chapter 4 and find out methods to minimise errors and optimise 
system performance for future high speed hybrid metropolitan QKD network applications. In 
the following sections, experimental tests are carried out to explore the influence of 
temperature on different parts of the whole network equipment. And from the theoretical 
analysis, the simulation results and experimental results are compared and summarized. 
5.2 Analysis of the effect of temperature changes on system 
5.2.1 Temperature logger 
The DS18B20 temperature sensor meets the requirements for applications in weather stations 
and home automation systems, and can easily controlled by Raspberry Pi. They are the same 
size as a transistor and use only one wire for the data signal. The sensor has a sensitivity of 
plus or minus 0.5 degrees Celsius and can measure temperatures ranging from -55 degrees 
Celsius to 125 degrees Celsius (-67 to 257 degrees Fahrenheit). In addition, the sensor measure 
the temperature and store it once for less than a second, which is much faster than the speed of 
the keys generated and stored in a hybrid network (>5km) using Toshiba equipment in this 
study. 
The sensor connected to a Raspberry Pi forms the temperature logger which is used in this 
project and shown in Figure 5.2.1.1(See Appendix 1 for the coding and wiring details of this 
set up).  
 






5.2.2 Long-term QKD system fluctuation trend 
Temperature measurements are carried out on two sets of QKD system without classical data 
systems, which are installed and compatible within a metropolitan area telecom network. Here 
two transmitters are located in a server room in the Cambridge University electrical division 
building with one receiver at Cambridge Central Network Facilities (CNF) and the other 
receiver at the Engineering department main site. The QKD systems from TREL use a 
decoyed-BB84 type protocol, termed “T12” with efficient basis selection to elevate the key 
rate, at a clock rate of 1GHz.  The systems run at 1GHz clock rate. The effect of finite key size 
is mitigated with a resulting key failure probability, ε= 10−10 decoy [42].  The locations are 
linked by two fibre pairs both approximately length of 5 km with a loss of 1.2 dB (0.24 dB/km), 
slightly higher than the standard spool fibre loss of 0.2 dB/km due to the presence of splices 
and other joints. More than 90% of the fibre is under ground and often the fibre is reported not 
susceptible to environmental factors affecting the transmission characteristics which are the 
received quantum states. The rest of the fibre above ground or in the lab may be affected by 
the surrounding environment. These factors can include temperature changes, both from 
ambient air temperature and direct solar radiation, causing expansion and contraction of the 
fibre length. The result is constantly changing conditions for the photon transmission, with the 
most important factors for QKD including transit time and birefringence changes.  
Figure 5.2.2 Temperature measurements map within Cambridge Quantum Network  
Note: the image shows that the scale is deviated from the actual, and the straight lines do not 




Figure 5.2.2(a). Trial results for the link between Electrical Department and Cambridge CNF 
Figure 5.2.2(a) illustrates one of the QKD link between Electrical department and Cambridge 
University CNF running without high speed classical data in order. The system then resultants 
in a 2.84 Mbps secure key rate with a 0.84 Mbps standard deviation. And QBER is (2.9 ± 1.0)% 
over five months continuous operations.  
Figure 5.2.2(b). Trial results for the link between Electrical Dept and Engineering main site 
Similarly, figure 5.2.2(b) shows another five months system operating results between two 
nodes connected via optical fibres with a length of 4.9 km within the Cambridge quantum 
network. This link with a total loss of 1.1dB leads to a mean QBER of 2.89% and standard 
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deviation of 0.3%. The secure key rate on the QKD link, with a mean of 2.75 Mbps and 
standard deviation of 0.36 Mbps. 
In both of the two figures above, it is worth to be noted that there exist sudden jumps on QBER 
and zero secure key rate which are both unwanted in real communication system. Spikes on 
QBER plots means values of QBER increases sharply and this can be caused by system power 
abruptly shut down, looseness of contact port of optical fibre and possibly system operating 
temperature which will be discussed in the following. The default settings of Toshiba 
equipment is that zero secure key rate is determined when the QBER is higher than specific 
threshold, that is approximately 7% (This value is also found and proved in Chapter 4 in this 
project, and there will be no secure information in this time. 
In addition, both of the figures indicate tendencies for the secure key rate and QBER to increase 
and decrease periodically to some extent. For any QKD system, especially for future high speed 
networks encrypted by QKD, it is very important to predict how system perform and those 
factors which may affect the system security. Hence, the following sections aim to analyse and 
identify the reasons that leads to such the performance. 
5.2.3 Analysis of temperature temporal fluctuation 
As mentioned previously, fibre length and detector efficiency affect QBER. Temperature is 
one of the most important factor that affects the detector’s efficiency in term of dark count and 
also affects fibre operation properties. The temperature history for several weeks in 2017 at 
Cambridge is plotted with QBER in Figure 5.2.3.1 to observe whether there is any apparently 
correlation between external temperature and QBER.  
 
Figure 5.2.3.1 QBER verses Temperature over weeks 
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From this plot, the value of QBER has an abnormal peak larger than 10% every week and when 
average temperature was around 10°C.  Also, most of the peaks, even smaller peaks (i.e. the 
peak at ~8% between week 1 and 2, week 2 and week three as well as peak at ~9% between 5 
and week 6) all occurred at the trough of the temperature waves. However, QBER did not 
always jump to such a high peak when temperature approaches 10 °C or peaks at each trough 
of the wave. Hence it is not very obvious or easy to make any conclusion at this stage. The next 
stage is to take a more advantage method rather than observations only to analysis these 
temperature related plot. 
Analysing deterministic signals is easy in time domain. However, most of the signals in 
communication systems are random, for example the noise in the time domain cannot be 
deterministically. One of way they can be analysed is in frequency domain. The Fourier 
transform (FT) decomposes a function of time (a signal) into its constituent frequencies. A fast 
Fourier transform (FFT) is an algorithm that computes the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of 
a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT). Fourier analysis converts a signal from its original domain 
(often time or space) to a representation in the frequency domain and vice versa. The DFT is 
obtained by decomposing a sequence of values into components of different frequencies. 
As the time and QBER are recorded as two set of sequences, i.e. each point in time corresponds 
to a value of QBER, we compute a fast Fourier transform for the data sets QBER verses Time 
shown below. 




Figure 5.2.3.2 Fast Fourier Transform of QBER 
Both of the FFT plots above show peaks at 16.7 min ( 1 / 0.06 ), 12.5min ( 1 / 0.08 ) or 5min 
( 1 / 0.2 ). Also, when the x-axis approaches 0.01 and 0, which is hourly and daily in time 
domain correspondingly, there also are peaks.  
The next step is to figure out what factors are consistent with these peaks. Taking a week of 
the data and plotting them on has shown in Figure 5.2.3.3. This plot clearly show the trend of 
periodic changes on a daily basis. 
 
Figure 5.2.3.3 Trial result of QBER daily data with moving average curve 
5.3 Performance investigation with temperature logger 
It has been discussed that there is no direct relationship between the temperature change of 
external weather and system abnormal performance. However, fibre and some optical 
components, such as interferometers, are usually sensitive to operating thermal variations can 
cause changes in the path and arrival time of the photons and result in changes in QBER and 
secure key rate. 
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The temperature loggers, are real-time thermometer shown in figure 5.3.1. These are placed in 
three different places in the room where the Toshiba QKD equipment is. These three locations 
were selected based on the location of the equipment‘s build-in cooling fans and the distance 
between the instrument placement and the air conditioners. The red one is the top of the Toshiba 
device box and the blue is on the ADVA.  The black is in the air between the two systems. 
These temperature loggers aim to record the temperature at which the system (except for the 
underground optical fibres) is operating, and then explore whether the temperature is related to 
the performance of the system.
 
Figure 5.3.1 Room temperature logger placement 
 
 
Figure 5.3.2 Room temperature logger over days 
(NB: The colour of the curve represents the position of the temperature sensor) 
The three scatter plots above show the temperature in different parts of the room over several 
days. The overall trend in temperature is the same, although the temperature at the three 
locations differs by around 6 ℃ . The temperature difference is mainly due to the high 
temperature caused by the heating of the equipment housing and the low local temperature 
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caused by the direct wind direction of the cooling fan. As a result for normal operations, we 
have chosen a location that is not near either the device housing or the cooling fan to record 
the operating temperature of the entire system (except for the externally buried underground 
optical fibres). 
 
Figure 5.3.3 Experimental result of Secure key rate vs. Room Temperature over a week  
Figure 5.3.3 illustrates the relationship between system operating environment temperature and 
QKD system secure key rate. As you can see, the overall temperature change and the secure 
key rate change are reversed. When the temperature rises, the secure key rate begins to decline, 
and when the temperature remains stable, the secure key rate then changes relatively little. The 
difference between the maximum and minimum temperature is about 3 ℃, while the change 
interval of the secure key rate is about 10 kbps.  
For further comparison, the data of another group of seven days are shown below. It can be 
seen from Figure 5.3.4 that the change trend of secure key rate and temperature is similar to 




Figure 5.3.4 Contrast experimental results 
According to the results of the two graphs, it can be preliminarily concluded that the change of 
temperature has an impact on the system performance, and low temperature can lead to higher 
secure key rate which is desirable in practical network. 
The next step is to take theoretical analysis and prediction of the effect of temperature changes 
on the system performance, and verify whether the theory is highly consistent with the previous 
trial results by using the control variable method. 
5.4  Theoretical Analysis 
Principles of QKD system set-up have been introduced in Chapter 2 and 3, the following 
illustration is a reference for further explanation to temperature effect on system performance. 
Firstly, the time difference between the two red pulses in Figure 5.4 below will affect the result 
of the system performance. Secondly, the number of photons reaching the last two single 
photon detectors also affects the value of QBER and then the secure key rate. Therefore, it is 
necessary to analyse the factors that may affect the pulse time difference and the number of 




Figure 5.4 Toshiba QKD system structure diagram 
Technically, two optical pulses from each arm arrive at the same time on the final beam-splitter. 
The optical frequency of the light source does not vary in time across the optical pulse and the 
two optical pulses from each arm arrive at the final beam-splitter with the same intensity. 
Polarization degradation mechanisms also exist in the optical fibre, and so optical pulse 
polarization rotation is corrected by polarization controller. Polarization dependent loss (PDL) 
will causes intensity difference to emerge between orthogonal polarisations of optical pulses. 
Polarization mode dispersion (PMD) causes time difference to emerge between the orthogonal 
polarisations of the optical pulses. PMD causes the time difference 𝛿𝑡  which means the 
interference at the final beam-splitter is degraded since the light pulses no longer overlap 
completely. PMD and PDL reduces the visibility V of the system and then QBER increases. 
However, Intensity issue has been improved by the technique (the T12 protocol [42]) for 
selecting the optimum intensity for pulses. 
Some other Toshiba equipment parameters are as follows, 
 Visibility V ~ 99% when δt =0 but drops quickly to < 40% if the light pulse delays δt 
is greater than 9ps 
 A change in visibility of 10% gives a 5% additional contribution to the QBER 
 Usually 7% for longer distance (>50km) and 10% QBER for shorter distance (<10km) 
leads to zero secure key rate 
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 For short delays of δt ~ 2ps the drop in visibility is negligible and can be regarded as 
no increase in QBER 





Where 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥  and 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑛  are the average pulse intensities for constructive and destructive 
interference respective. 
5.4.1 Time delay on optical fibre 
The propagation time through an optical fibre varies due to environmental changes 
(temperature, vibrations etc.), which is undesirable in a host of applications, such as precise 
time and frequency transfers or applications requiring highly accurate time synchronization of 
(data) signals [162].  
As far as the temperature dependence of the refractive index of fused silica is concerned, many 
experimental investigations have been presented (see for example, Refs [163-165]), and they 
have shown that the refractive indices of fused silica are directly proportional to the 
temperature with the temperature coefficients lying in the range of [5 × 10−6, 3 × 10−5] (𝐾−1) 
when the temperature is in the range from roughly 100 K to 800 K. 
Figure 5.4.1.1 Changes in DGD for three different wavelengths (directly copy from [166]) 
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Studies [166] also report changes in PMD, and hence the differential group delay DGD, are 
well correlated with changes in the local ambient temperature. As is shown in Figure 5.4.1.1, 
48-hour measures shows the DGD is less than 0.5ps for a 150km long Single Mode Fibre. 
The temperature in the laboratory where the system operates fluctuates to a maximum of 10 
degrees Celsius by non-human factors. Moreover, the total length of the single-mode fibre reel 
connected to the system during the experiment is no more than 100km (the total fibre loss is 
usually no more than 25dB).  
In summary and theoretically, this value (DGD < 0.5ps) is less than the threshold value(δt ~ 
2ps), so the delay caused by temperature change on the fibre will not affect the system 
performance.  
5.4.2 Dark count at detector 
In simple terms, the value of QBER can be simplified as, 
𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅 =  
𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
 
As the temperature goes up, the number of dark count that reach the detector end is going to 
rise, so there are more unwanted photons that reach the end and then the value of QBER is 
going to go up. 
In addition, the following figure shows a simplified system performance analysis model for 
different fibre length. 
 
Figure 5.4.2.1 Basic communication system model 
Assume that only dark count is taken into consideration at this stage and the system loss is only 
caused by fibre attenuation. For a 50km and 100km optical fibre, the photons arrive at single 
photon detector can be written as, 
𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛50𝑘𝑚−𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 × 10% (10dB loss) 






For light input of the same intensity, when temperature goes up (i.e. dark counts increase) ,the 
impact of the dark count for a 100km link is more significant than for a shorter 50km fibre link. 
5.5 Experimental implementation 
It has been seen that temperature changes affect the results of the system performance, and the 
theoretical analysis predicts that the single-photon detector in the transceiver is susceptible to 
temperature especially for longer fibre lengths, but the fibre itself is not highly sensitive to 
temperature. The main purpose of the experiment is to verify the theoretical analysis results 
and prove that the influence of temperature change on the system mainly comes from Alice 
and Bob. 
The experiment is divided into two parts. The first part is to change the operating environment 
temperature of the whole equipment (including the transmission fibre) as shown in the Figure 
5.5, and the other part is to only change the temperature around the transmission fibre. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Experimental set-up for controlling the room temperature 
Air-conditioner Controlled Room
Alice Bob
Port A Port B
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5.5.1 Room temperature control 
First, A pair of Alice and Bob were placed in A temperature-controlled room, with a 90km-
long fibre (~ 21𝑑𝐵 loss) optic connection between port A and port B. Do not actively adjust 
the set temperature of the air conditioning, 24 hours, the system performance is as follows. 
Figure 5.5.1(a) 24h system performance (90km fibre) without adjusting the room temperature 
In the absence of any artificial temperature change, the temperature difference in the room over 
a continuous 24-hour period is approximately 3 ℃. As shown in previous experiments, when 
the temperature increases, the secure key rate decreases but QBER goes up. 
The change of indoor temperature is mainly regulated by the central air-conditioning system 
according to the external environment. When a specific constant temperature is set actively, 
the indoor temperature will be relatively stable at the set value. 
For a 50km(~11𝑑𝐵 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) optical fibre connected between A and B, secure key rate drops from 
100 kbps to 80bps and QBER jumps from 3.5% to 5% when room temperature increase from 
21℃ to 25.5 ℃.  
Figure 5.5.1(b) System performance with adjusting the room temperature for 50km fibre 
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Replacing the connection port A and port B with a 20dB optical attenuator and then setting the 
room temperature initially to 24℃, and then changing the room temperature in steps after 
different periods of time, the system performance is shown below. When the temperature is 
relatively stable at a certain value, such as 24℃  or 25.5℃ , the secure key rate remains 
correspondingly stable. But at higher temperatures, the rate is lower than that at lower 
temperatures. And QBER has the inverse trend to secure key rate for the whole period. 
Figure 5.5.1(c) System performance with adjusting room temperature for 20dB Attenuator 
Taken together, the preliminary conclusion can be drawn that changing the temperature of the 
whole system does affect the performance of the system. At the same time, the greater the 
attenuation of the channel is, the longer the generation time of each key will take. The 
experimental results here are consistent with the theoretical analysis, and the next step is to 
control the variables to exclude the influence of temperature on the fibre. 
5.5.2 Fibre temperature control 
According to the previous results, setting the room temperature to a constant temperature at 
21℃. An insulated box is then fitted with the fibre spool, a temperature logger and a Light-
House Greenhouse Heater to control the operating temperature of the fibre. 
 
Figure 5.5.2(a) Fibre temperature investigation experimental set-up 
Alice Bob





For the longest fibre length, 90 km, that the system can withstand, the performance of the 
system under two different operating temperatures of the fibre is shown in Figure 5.3.2(b). 
Figure 5.5.2(b) System with 90km fibre connected performance at 22.5℃ and 27.5℃ 
After the temperature in the box has stabilized for a period of time, record data for six 
consecutive hours. Secure key rate reaches 6.7 ± 0.4 kbps at 22.5℃ and slightly changes to 6.6 
± 0.3 kbps when temperature goes up to 27.5℃. 
5.6 Discussion  
The relationship between the number of dark photons and temperature is roughly estimated 
based upon the research [56], and the MATLAB simulation results as shown in Figure 5.5.2(c) 
below are obtained and the parameters are same as previous chapters apart from changing dark 
current rate as temperature changes (refer to Table 4.2.3). Both simulation and experimental 




Figure 5.6.1 Matlab simulation for room temperature effect at different fibre length 
SKR represents the speed at which the system generates a valid key. Take the average value of 
a series of temperatures and SKR respectively, and then draw the scatter diagram, as shown in 
Figure 5.6.2. We find that the value of SKR decreases approximately linearly as the 
temperature increases. As indicated by Eq (23), dark current noise is proportional to 
temperature, thus reducing the value of SKR. Since the controlled temperature can only be 
within the range of 20℃ to 30℃, the trend is approximately linear. 
   





Chapter 5 firstly proposed the temperature effect on QKD system performance. Then 
theoretically analysis and predict the relationship between temperature change and secure key 
rate as well as quantum bit error rate. It has been proved and verified that time delay effect due 
to temperature changes around fibre itself can be ignored as it will not lead to any performance 
degradation. Room temperature changes dominate system performances , that is , the higher 
temperature environment where system (i.e. Alice and Bob) locate, the lower secure key rate 
and higher QBER value will be.  For both fibre reels, especially long distance(> 50km), and 
attenuators connected into the system, As the temperature rises from 24 to 28 degrees Celsius, 
the secure key rate drops from 100 kbps to 80 kbps (appx. 20% performance worse). 
Simulations results matches the experimental results as system operation temperatures 
increases SAPD dark count and will the secure key rate be deducted. Last but not the least, For 




Chapter 6. Suppression of Raman noise by polarisation control 
Chapter 5 has demonstrated some of the factors that will degrade the secure key rate under some 
circumstances. This chapter report how Raman noise affects the hybrid system and the effect 
of optical polarization drift on the performance of the system. Finally address these issues 
corresponding optimal solutions are proposed to. 
6.1 Motivation 
So far, the design and experimental demonstration of the QKD system have been carried out 
on dark fibres [4, 90, 94, 97, 113]. This limits the deployable capability of QKD to a limited 
number of scenarios where the barriers associated with dark fibre availability and price can be 
overcome. On the other hand, wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) allows sharing a fibre 
to transmit multiple optical channels using different wavelengths. WDM compatibility between 
quantum communication and classical communication allows the deployment of QKD on fibre 
optics. This enhances the compatibility of quantum communications with existing optical 
infrastructures and leads to significant improvements in QKD in terms of cost effectiveness 
and addressable markets. 
However, the coexistence of QKD with the intense classical channel presents a new challenge 
to QKD. The optical power of optical classical channel is several orders of magnitude larger 
than that of quantum channel due to single photon level. Multiplexing classical and quantum 
signals on a single optical fibre can lead to significant additional noise in quantum 
communication due to inadequate isolation or optical nonlinearity [167, 168]. Processing this 
kind of noise is a major problem in quantum key distribution system. Filtering technology is 
needed to improve the ratio of quantum signal to WDM noise. The realization of this filter will 
cause additional loss and seriously affect the performance of QKD. This is especially 
applicable for systems that rely on spectral wideband single-photon detectors [168]. 
This thesis has introduced the world fastest QKD link and demonstrated a gigabits classical 
system encrypted by Toshiba QKD system which is stable for long term field trials. Since the 
transmitter energy level of a traditional data link is proportional to the data rate, it is of great 
benefit to find the relationship between the appropriate incident energy level and the noise, as 
well as to find the method that can be optimized for hybrid system performance. 
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6.2 Raman noise sources in a QKD-WDM system 
 
Figure 6.2.1 Hybrid system field trial diagram 
In chapter 4, a field trial of a QKD system is introduced, and an experimental design is then 
carried out as shown in Figure 6.2.1 As shown in the figure above, three traditional optical 
fibre communication systems are connected in series. Two ends of each fibre have a pair of 
QKD systems (Alice and Bob) to encrypt the information, and the classical optical signal enters 
from point A in the figure and passes through a series of nodes (e.g. Node B and C located at 
TREL) and three segments of fibre and ends at point F.  
 
Figure 6.2.2 Hybrid system field trial secure key rate 
When the optical signal is input at point A, the signal strength is attenuated by the fiber and the 
connectors. Hence the light energy input to Link 1 at point E is higher than that of link 3 input 
at point A and link 2 input at point C. As can be seen from the figure above, the link 3 with the 
highest power produces the slowest key and the lowest input power into link 1 results in the 
largest secure key rate. Each pair of Alice and Bob are manufactured to be identical and kept 
in rooms with a relatively constant and constant temperature. Therefore, the different secure 
key rates here are mainly due to different classical power level. 
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Typically the classical and quantum signals are multiplexed using standard wavelength 
division multiplexing technology (WDM). Two main technical difficulties arise when trying 
to multiplex the two types of signals in the same optical fiber. The first one is related to the 
fact that the power level difference between a classical signal and the single-photon level can 
reach 100 dB. Even small crosstalk can really saturate the single-photon detectors. The other 
hurdle is noise generated from the classical channels when photons are inelastically scattered 
due to the spontaneous Raman scattering (SRS) limitation [35, 87, 168] . 
Figure 6.2.3 shows how the Toshiba QKD system encrypts high-speed signals through the fibre 
by multiplexer and de-multiplexer. Ideally there is only a single photon per optical pulse for a 
quantum channel. And the data channel has much higher power (> 60dB) than the quantum 
channel. However each pulse contains lots of photons for a Gb/s data link transmission and the 
majority is lost due to attenuation in the fibre. Although the wavelength of data channel, clock, 
quantum channel etc. are different, they are all combined and then transmitted in a single 
optical fiber. If the isolation is insufficient between each channel, expecially the high power 
signal, it will highly possilbe lead to impairments affect the quantum signals and finnaly 
degrades the secure key rate. 
 
Figure 6.2.3 Hybrid system diagram 
The analysis of Raman noise on QKD has been carried out in Chapter 3, In the following, we 
analyse the impact of the spontaneous Raman scattered noise generated from multiple optical 
classical channels (all wavelengths produced and transmitted over the system) on a single 




6.3 Experimental implementation of studying Raman scattering on the 
high-speed QKD-WDM network 
Before starting the experiment, it is necessary to identify the wavelengths that the system uses 
and the measurement appears as shown in Figure 6.3(a). Here connects one Alice and Bob to 
the Optical Spectrum Analyzer (OSA) in turn,  and then measures and records the wavelength 
data. 
Figure 6.3(a) Alice and Bob wavelength inspections 
Each Alice (or Bob) can output (or input/detect) eight different wavelengths of light. The 
wavelength ranges from 1470nm to 1610nm at intervals of 20nm. Within the detectable range 
of the OSA, Alice has three different signal outputs when the system is working, with 
maximum power of -16 dBm at the wavelength of 1510nm. According to the system 
instructions and practical needs, eight wavelengths are assigned for clock, optical time domain 
reflectometry (OTDR), phase compensation and reconciliation. 1530nm is allocated for the 
transmission of external classical high-speed optical signals and 1550nm is used for QKD 
signal transmissions.  
Stimulated Raman scattering (SRS) can occur simultaneously in both forward and backward 
directions relative to the pump laser propagation. However, due to the different gain 
coefficients and interaction routes in these two directions, the experimental gain ratio of 
forward and backward SRS may strongly deviate from unity [169, 170]. 
In the actual communication process, the light energy at the wavelength of 1530nm will change 
with the propagation data rate and is much larger than the single photon power at 1550nm, 






following experiments, both the forward and backward stimulated Raman scattering effect due 
to 1530nm light at different power levels acting on the light of 1550nm is mainly focused.  
6.3.1 Experimental set-up 
The fundamental quantity characterizing spontaneous Raman scattering is the effective Raman 
scattering cross-section 𝜌(𝜆) , measured as a function of the wavelength 𝜆 . The effective 
Raman scattering cross-section is intimately related to the commonly measured fibre 
characteristics, Raman gain [169].  
The Raman scattered power emerging from the fibre input, 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑚,𝑏, and fibre output, 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑚,𝑓 , 
can be calculated as  
𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑚,𝑏 =  𝑁𝑏 . 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡 .
sinh(𝛼𝐿)
𝛼
 . 𝜌(𝜆) . ∆𝜆 
𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑚,𝑓 =  𝑁𝑓  . 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡 . 𝐿 . 𝜌(𝜆) .  ∆𝜆 
where index 𝑏  stands for “backward” , 𝑓  for “forward”, 𝑁𝑏  and 𝑁𝑓  denote the number of 
backward and forward classical channels, ∆𝜆 denotes quantum receiver bandwidth, and the 
optical power at the fibre output is 
𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡 =  𝑃𝑖𝑛 . 𝑒
−𝛼𝐿 
with 𝑃𝑖𝑛is the power of the optical signal at the fibre input. 
 
Figure 6.3.1(a) Matlab simulation of Raman noise vs Fibre length 
Relationship between the Raman power and the transmission distance are given in figure above. 
The power of the forward-Raman reaches a peak value at a distance about 25 km in before it 
starts to decline, while that of the backward-Raman saturates and does not decrease with 
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distance. In the case of forward-Raman, the accumulation of Raman scattering power along the 
fibre is eventually outstripped by the increasing fibre attenuation, leading to a reduction of 
forward-Raman power. In contrast, backward-Raman power travels back to the input of fibre 
and is not subjected to higher loss with increasing distance. Hence, the power of backward-
Raman never decreases but reaches saturation asymptotically. 
Raman noise will produce extra photons arriving at Alice and Bob terminals, thus affecting 
system performance. As for the forward Raman noise, the influence of Raman noise on the 
system decreases gradually with the increase of fibre transmission length, so it is not a priority 
concern in the long distance transmission. However, the backward Raman noise is saturated 
and unchanged in a system over about 10km and increases linearly with the increase of the 
input optical power. In other words, in the long-distance transmission system, noise photons 
generated by the reverse Raman noise must be received by Alice, thus the QBER value 
increases while the system performance gets worse. 
Due to the limitations of Toshiba QKD system, the length of the fibre and the classical 
communication channel power can be modified during the actual operation, apart from the 
temperature effect mentioned in the previous Chapter. From the equations above, it can be seen 
that the Raman power is positively correlated with the incident signal power. And the length 
of the fibre in the system also affects the power. 
Considering the limitations of Toshiba's QKD system, the experiment does not use Alice and 
Bob, but instead, a separate experiment is used to simulate the study which is shown in Figure 
6.3.1(b). The main purpose of this experiment is to study how many photons at 1550nm are 
detected when incident light of different wavelengths is transmitted through a series of 
components and optical channels. 
A Continuous Wave(CW) Laser is used in the experiment to produce the required wavelength 
of light. Since the wavelength of light produced by the laser is hardly possible to produce a 
pure wavelength of light, a band pass filter (BPF) selecting corresponding wavelength is 
connected after the CW laser in order to screen out the specific wavelength of light more 
accurately. A circulator is a passive, non-reciprocal three- or four-port device, in which an 
optical signal entering any port is transmitted to the next port in rotation (only). It aims to divert 
scattered photons from two directions to each detector. The two variable optical attenuators 
(VOA) are used to change the overall attenuations of the link not only for protecting single 
photon detector but also find out the system limitations. Once the optical signal passes through 
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the fibre, it is then divided into two beams by an optical splitter. 10% of the light is used for 
monitoring and the other 90% goes into a 1550nm band pass filter. Here the filter aims to select 
1550nm photons only and lead them to the single photon detector (SPD) at the receiver end. 
Similarly, the band pass filter and single photon detector on the backward arm work for the 
same purpose. 
The CW laser is tuneable and is able to output different wavelength and power, and VOA#1 
can also change the intensity of the light entering the fibre. Hence the next step is to explore 
how many 1550 nm photons can be produced by the same power at different wavelengths and 
by the same wavelength at different powers. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.1(b)Raman scattering experiment set-up 
6.3.2 Analysis of experimental results 
a. 1550nm input and BPF + 1550nm photon detection 
Firstly, an 8.9km optical fibre reel is connected to the system as shown in Figure 6.3.1(b). 
When both of the wavelength of incident light and first band-pass filter range is 1550nm, 
VOA#1 in the figure above is adjusted to change the light power entering the fibre. Gradually 
the power into the fibre is increased and the corresponding value on the single-photon receiver 
at the forward end is recorded.  
The trigger frequency of the single photon detector, that is the internal clock, is 1MHz and the 
maximum count per trigger is 500,000.  Within the range of the optical power injected into the 
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fibre being changed from −105 𝑑𝐵𝑚 to −70 𝑑𝐵𝑚, the difference between power input to the 
fibre and the power at the forward end single photon detector is 15dB due to transmission loss 
(fibre attenuation, insertion loss, components attenuation etc.) through the link. The single 
photon detector count saturates when the incident power is larger than -65dBm.  So ideally, 
assuming the single photon detector has no upper limit, the number of photons is proportional 
to the power of the incident signal. 
 
Figure 6.3.2.1 1550nm input and detection plot  
 
b. 1510nm input and BPF + 1550nm photon detection 
The input wavelength of the light is set to 1510nm and the filter at the input is replaced with a 
1510nm- band-pass filter. Then, 5km of optical fibre is connected to the system and gradually 




Figure 6.3.2.2(a) 1510nm input and 1550nm detection plot  
The corresponding counts shown on single photon detector is recorded for each value of fibre 
input power. And then replace the fibre with longer length and repeat the steps. The input 
wavelength is approximately pure 1510 nm due to the 1510nm band-pass filter at input end 
and therefore should not be any 1550nm photons detected at the end. Any 1550nm photons 
arriving at the single photon detector are regarded as the forward Raman effect.  
The results are plotted in figure 6.3.2.2(a) and in general, for a fixed fibre length, the forward 
Raman effect is approximately linear to the power launched onto the fibre. As can be seen from 
the figure above, when the input light power is fixed and the length of the fibre is varied, the 
forward Raman effect result is different. 
Figure 6.3.2.2(b) demonstrates the trend line for forward Raman counts at different fibre 
lengths when the power into the fibre is -15dBm. For the same input power, the forward Raman 
counts increase when fibre length gets longer and peaks at 25km. In other words, forward 




Figure 6.3.2.2(b) SPD vs Fibre length for 1510nm input and 1550nm detection  
c. 1530nm input and BPF + 1550nm photon detection 
In order to study the forward Raman effect at different wavelengths, especially the designed 
wavelength 1530nm allocated to Giga-bps classical data channel, one changes the input 
wavelength of the light to 1530nm and replaces the filter at the input with 1530nm- band-pass 
filter. Then, 5km fibre is connected to the system and one gradually adjusts the value of VOA#1 
to change the optical power launched into the fibre. 
The corresponding counts shown on single photon detector are recorded for each value of fibre 
input power. The fibre is replaced with longer lengths and as the steps repeated. The result of 
the 1530nm input signal is shown in figure 6.3.2.3 and indicates the same trend as figure 
6.3.2.2(a). For each fibre length, the forward Raman effect is proportional to fibre input power. 
And for any fixed input power, The forward Raman noise first increases and then decreases 




Figure 6.3.2.3 1530nm input and 1550nm detection plot  
 
d. Comparison between forward and backward Raman noise 
In addition to forward Raman noise, backward Raman noise, which has been mentioned earlier, 
also affects the number of photons on the receiving end.  Figure 6.3.1(a) compares the 
relationship between A and B in terms of fibre length based upon theoretical mathematics 
models via Matlab. As we can see, in the forward scattering direction Raman noise reaches a 
maximum 20km, and then decreases along with classical channel power. In the backward 
direction, noise reaches a saturation level as the distance increases. The count number of single 
photon detector at backward direction end shown in Figure 6.3.1(b). This shows the backward 
Raman effect on the system. The experimental results of forward and backward Raman 
scattering are integrated and fitted on the simulation curve shown in Figure 6.3.2.4.  
For the 1510nm input and 1550nm detection experiment, measurements are taken at a fixed 
−19 𝑑𝐵𝑚 input power for each different length of fibre ranging from 8.9km to 98km. The 
forward Raman scattering starts to decline when fibre length is longer than 26.7km (fibre loss 
𝑓𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ~ 5.8𝑑𝐵) experimentally and backward Raman begins to saturate at fibre length 






Figure 6.3.2.4 Fitted curve for 1510nm(up) and 1530nm(down) Raman scattering 
For the 1530nm input and 1550nm detection experiment, measurements are produced at 
different input powers for lengths of fibre ranging from 8.9km to 98km. At each different fibre 
input power, the forward Raman scattering all starts to decline when fibre length is longer than 
26.7km (fibre loss 𝑓𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ~ 5.8𝑑𝐵) experimentally and the backward Raman scattering 
begins to saturate at fibre length longer than 31.5km (𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ~ 6.9𝑑𝐵).  In addition, the 




e. Wavelength reversal  
Figure 6.3.2.5(a) Wavelength reversal experiment set-up 
The previous sections have studied the effects of relatively short wavelengths on longer 
wavelengths (i.e. 1510nm and 1530nm Raman effect on 1550nm), and the effects of slightly 
longer wavelengths on shorter wavelengths  (i.e. 1550nm Raman effect on 1510nm or 1530nm) 
will be discussed here. 
Similarly, the experiment is shown in figure 6.3.2.5 (a). The input end is a 1550nm Continuous 
Wave laser (CW laser) connected with a 1550nm band-pass filter which aims to select and 
output 1550nm light only onto the later system. The forward and reverse end single photon 





Figure 6.3.2.5(b) Raman effect of 1550nm on 1510nm and 1510nm on 1550nm 
Firstly, one sets the two band-pass filters at the end to 1510nm and adjusting both the CW laser 
power output and VOA#1 to make sure the power input to the fibre is −19.19 𝑑𝐵𝑚. For fibre 
length ranging from 8.9km to 98km, experimental results fit the simulation curves shown in 
figure 6.3.2.5(b). The backward saturation level of the Raman effect of 1550nm for 1510nm is 
larger than that of 1510nm on 1550nm light. 
 
 
Figure 6.3.2.5(c) Raman effect of 1550nm on 1530nm and 1530nm on 1550nm 
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Similarly, with the two band-pass filters at the end set to 1530nm, one sets both the CW laser 
power output and VOA#1 to make sure the power input to the fibre is −19.19 𝑑𝐵𝑚. Figure 
6.3.2.5(c) demonstrates both the experimental and simulation results.  
6.4 Analysis of an external polarization controller effect on the network  
The top half of the Toshiba QKD device is a transmitter that includes a light source that 
generates short pulses of linearly polarized light, so that light travels along the slow axis of the 
polarization-maintaining fibre. However, while light travels along the slow axis in the system 
shown below, in other systems the light source can be coupled to the fibre, allowing light to 
travel along the fast axis. The light pulse then enters an asymmetric Mach Zehnder 
interferometer (MZI), which in this case ACTS as a phase encoder encoding random critical 
information. 
 
Figure 6.4 schematic of Toshiba QKD system  
The Mach-Zehnder Interferometer is constructed using polarization maintaining fibre. First, 
the light pulses on entering the MZI pass through a coupler that splits the incoming light pulses 
into two paths. The first path comprises a longer arm (i.e. the upper arm in the diagram) of the 
interferometer using an optical delay loop. The other shorter path comprises a phase modulator 
that encodes random key information onto the light pulse. Due to the variation in the length of 
two arms, light pulses that follow either the short path and the long path suffer a temporal 
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separation ∆t. This temporal separation may be set to 
1
2
 the inverse clock rate of the QKD 
system. The pulses are then combined at a polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The PBS has the 
property that one of the input arms polarization is rotated by 90 degrees. This results in an 
output which has a polarization that can be decomposed into two orthogonal polarizations 
separated by a short time ∆t.  The pulses are then attenuated to the single photon level using 
an optical attenuator resulting in single photon pulses and before being emitted from the 
transmitter into an optical channel which is the optical fibre in this thesis.  
The polarization beam splitter directs the light pulse to the long or short arm of the MZI 
containing the phase modulator based on the input polarization of the light phase. The receiving 
terminal phase modulator is used to decode the random key information on the optical pulse. 
In the PBS inside the transmitter, the PBS rotation at the receiver end comes from the 
polarization of the different arms. Therefore, the two outputs have the same polarization. With 
the correct input polarization, one of the two light pulses travels along the long arm of the 
transmitter interferometer and the other along the short arm. Thus, the delay loop cancels out 
the time difference between the two light pulses ∆t, and since the two light pulses completely 
overlap, the optical interference results in the final beam-splitter. 
In the process described above, the most important thing is that the PBS is polarization 
dependent and also the reference signal and quantum signal will be recombined at the same 
time at the receiver. If there is a classical light, that is the photon produced due to Raman effect, 
arrive at the  same time of quant signal and orthogonal, it won’t affect the detector. Otherwise, 
the noisy photons induced by classical signal will be wrongly detected and discard according 
to T12 protocols which will leads to higher QBER and lower secure key rate.  
Therefore, changing the polarization of classical signal Raman photons to the detector can 




6.4.1 Experiment on changing the photon polarization 
Figure 6.4.1 (a) experiment set-up for changing classical polarization at receiver 
Figure 6.4.1(a) illustrates the experimental setup for changing the classical signal Raman noise 
photon polarization. CW laser is used to output the optical signal with the wavelength of 
1530nm. Then a VOA is used to adjust the system attenuation and protection instrument. The 
band pass filter has a passing frequency of 1530nm to ensure that the signal entering the 
subsequent optical path is as close as possible to 1530nm, which is the frequency band of the 
traditional signal in the actual QKD hybrid communication network. The two polarization 
controllers are then positioned as shown to change the polarization direction of the photons 
entering the fibre and the final single photon detector. The bandpass filter has a passing 
frequency of 1550nm to ensure that as many photons as possible enter the single-photon 
detector at 1550nm, so that the number of photons measured by the single-photon detector can 
represent the light at 1530nm for the Raman noise at 1550nm. 
Firstly, connecting the PBS to the optical path as shown in the figure 6.4.1(a), and then one 
adjusts the two polarization controllers to record the number of photons shown on SPD. Then 
the PBS is removed, and the polarization controllers are adjusted separately to record the 
number of photons and the results are shown in the Figure 6.4.1(b). The number of counts 
differs when the PBS is connected onto the path and changes either the polarization 





Figure 6.4.1 (b) Experimental results of polarization control 
A polarization controller is an optical device which allows one to modify the polarization state 
of light. Once the polarization controller varies during the transmission, some photon 
polarizations states are changed to vertical or horizontal so that they can be selected or filtered 
by the PBS. As shown on the left of figure 6.4.1(b),  the SPD counts can be minimised under 
some circumstance and hence changing the photon states potentially reduces the Raman counts 
on system performance.  
Next, the polarization controller is connected to the hybrid QKD system to explore whether the 
system performance can be improved in the actual network communication process. But 
because of the limitations of the Toshiba system's interface (i.e., the system has no manually 
controlled optical output), the processing of the signal takes place inside the box, and only a 
polarization controller can be added before the quantum transmitter Alice to change the 




6.4.2 Experiments on adding external polarization controller 
Figure 6.4.2 (a) shows the experiment setup used to add an external optical polarization 
controller to reduce the effect of the Raman noise of the traditional communication signal on 
the quantum signal. In the dotted box is the optical path diagram that realizes the high speed 
traditional communication. The resulting high-speed optical signal at 1531nm is encrypted by 
the quantum signal produced by Toshiba Alice and transmitted to Bob via optical fibre. At the 
Bob end, the quantum signal and the traditional optical signal are separated (i.e. de-
multiplexed), the quantum signal is then used for encryption and decryption analysis based up 
T12 protocol, and the traditional signal can be analysed or for further error correction after 
output from one of Bob's ports. 
 
Figure 6.4.2(a) Diagram of adding external polarization controller 
In this experimental exploration, the modulation mode of traditional high-speed signal and the 
performance of the system (i.e., the bit error rate) are not that important, as long as the data 
rate reaches the required level and other parameters such as the classical data power into Alice 
port meet the equipment requirements. 
The traditional communication signals in the dotted box are pre-tested and calibrated before 
being fed into the transmitter, Alice. The data rate is set to be 10Gbps and the link is able to 
operate up to 25km (error free BER < 10−12) and the power launches into fibre is up to 
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−8 𝑑𝐵𝑚. However, since the input signal to Alice should not be greater than −10 𝑑𝐵𝑚, the 
optical signal is set to attenuate to −10.2 𝑑𝐵𝑚 before being sent to Alice, resulting in the bit 
error rate rising to 10−9. 
First, the QKD system is put into a laboratory with little temperature change (Room 
temperature ~ 20.0 ± 0.5 ºC) in order to minimise the temperature effect on system performance 
and run for 24 hours. The result is shown in figure 6.4.2(b) where the QBER value is 4.1% ±
0.18%. 
Figure 6.4.2(b) QKD only plot 
Next, the modulated 10Gbps traditional signal is fed into Alice to be encrypted and then 
transmitted through a 19.8km single mode fibre (fibre loss ~ 4.4𝑑𝐵). The value of QBER 
increases to 5.7% ± 0.44% and fluctuates more than that of QKD signal only shown in figure 
6.4.2 (c). 
 
Figure 6.4.2(c) QKD+10Gbps classical plot  
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Connect a optic polarization controller prior to Alice's classical signal input port. Then slowly 
one adjusts the angle of the control plate of optic polarization controller to change the 
polarization angle of the classical signal into the system. Then the whole system is left to run 
without any changes for an hour and the changes in the value of QBER are recorded. Then one 
changes the angle of the polarizer a little bit and repeats the previous steps and records the data. 
When the optical polarization controller is added and the angle of the polarizer is changed, the 
power of the output signal measured by the optical power-metre at the Bob end remains 
unchanged. Therefore, the addition of the polarization controller does not change the optical 
power of the original traditional signal. As shown in the figure below, changing the angle of 
the light polarizer does change the value of QBER in some short periods of time (1h-2h and 
5h-6h). 
Figure 6.4.2(d) QKD+10Gbps classical plot with external polarization controller 
 
𝑸𝑩𝑬𝑹𝟏𝒉−𝟐𝒉 = 𝟒. 𝟕% ± 𝟎. 𝟏𝟑% 
𝑸𝑩𝑬𝑹𝟓𝒉−𝟔𝒉 = 𝟒. 𝟔% ± 𝟎. 𝟐𝟏% 
𝑸𝑩𝑬𝑹𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 = 𝟓. 𝟕% ± 𝟎. 𝟑𝟏% 
𝑸𝑩𝑬𝑹𝒅𝒊𝒇𝒇 =
(
(𝟒. 𝟕 + 𝟒. 𝟔)
𝟐 ) − 𝟓. 𝟕
𝟓. 𝟕
= − 𝟏𝟖% 
During the time period of the two abnormal results, the value of QBER decreased by about 1% 




6.5 Discussion and summary  
In this chapter, it is firstly concluded from the previous field trial results that the input of 
traditional communication signals weakens the quantum signals to a certain extent. For the 
Toshiba QKD system pair that can be considered as identical, the input of a higher traditional 
signal will lead to a lower secure key rate, and the results show that the input signal increases 
by 3dB, and the secure key rate decreases from about 2.7 Mbps to 1.3 Mbps. Then it is pointed 
out theoretically that the traditional optical signal input simultaneously produces Raman noise 
to the quantum signal and degrades the secure key rate as well as increasing the value of QBER 
as a consequence. Then, the experiment confirmed that the signals of 1530nm and 1510nm 
wavelength would produce Raman noise for the quantum signals of 1550nm in the single-
photon level, which would affect the performance of the system. Although the Toshiba system 
in practical applications generate signals in other bands except 1510nm and 1530nm, for 
instance 1490nm and 1570nm, since the Raman noise is proportional to the light power input 
demonstrated from this experiment, the Raman noise generated by the relatively small signal 
input power of other bands need not be considered.  
At the same time, high wavelength on low wavelength and low wavelength on high wavelength 
Raman noises are explored, and it is proved that 1510nm and 1530nm can be selected as the 
wavelength of traditional communication channels. However, in this research, Toshiba 
equipment also pre-limits the wavelength of traditional signal to 1530nm.  
 
Figure 6.5.1 Raman noise limitation to transmission distance 
As for Raman noise, the greater the power of the traditional signal is, the greater the number 
of photons will be produced. For each 3dB of input power, the number of photons doubles. For 
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optical fibres of different lengths, positive Raman noise first increases and then decreases with 
the increase of length, and reaches its peak at about 20km. The inverse Raman noise increases 
with the length of the fibre and becomes saturated after about 30km. That is to say, for a long-
distance (usually greater than 30km) quantum cryptographic communication system, the 
reverse Raman is an important reason to limit the communication distance. The system requires 
that the signal to noise ratio should be greater than 10dB. Therefore, if only the long-distance 
optical fibre is considered to be affected by the reverse Raman noise, as shown in Figure 6.4.1, 
the communication distance of the system is up to about 280km. However, the actual 
communication system is subject to other influences such as attenuation, dispersion and 
channel cross talk, so the communication distance is much less than 280km. 
 
Figure 6.4.2 1550nm Raman scattering from different wavelength (directly copy from [171]) 
Due to the limitation of the main operating band of the laboratory laser and the filter in the C 
band, the influence of the wavelength signal greater than 1560nm on the quantum signal 
(1550nm) in the system has not been explored. However, since the power of signals in these 
bands is far less than that of traditional communication signals (the difference is more than 
10dB), and anti-stoke scattering is smaller than stoke scattering as shown in the figure, only 
1530nm signal's influence on 1550nm Raman noise should be considered in actual 
communication. 
Finally, through the analysis of Toshiba system, it is found that adding a light polarization 
controller can improve the performance of the system, that is, QBER can improve about 18%. 
However, since the optical polarization controller changes the angle randomly, one cannot 
accurately measure and determine the relationship between the angle of the photon and the 
wave plate. Therefore, in the future, quantitative analysis can be carried out to further improve 
the impact of Raman noise on Hybrid QKD system in terms of polarization control. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and future work 
Quantum key distribution is changing and revolutionizing the distribution of secret keys for 
securing the data information. Different from traditional cryptography, QKD makes the 
security of information transmission ensured by quantifiable security and detection of 
eavesdroppers become possible. In additional, QKD is able to potentially protect corporate and 
individual data and protect critical information infrastructure. Since the establishment of the 
initial  fundamental protocol of QKD in 1984, huge progress in many aspects has been archived 
in this communication and encryption field. Not only QKD protocols have been improved to 
eliminate vulnerabilities caused by imperfect practical QKD equipment, but also breaking 
through the transmission distance of QKD on dark fibres in both laboratory and the field trials. 
Developing the security for the current network infrastructure reliably and facing the coming 
quantum computing level decryption have never been a more pressing issue. Accounts in which 
personal and business data have been hacked are often reported, and the resulting consequences 
can cause significant damage and loss to the parties involved. Therefore, strengthening the 
security of networks that transmit sensitive data is critical to mitigate the threat of data theft. 
Using quantum cryptography to protect network data channel is a robust data communication 
security protection method, whose security comes from the quantum mechanics law. However, 
this security comes at a cost: quantum states often have to be used to transmit information, and 
these carriers are extremely fragile. As a result, previous approaches to building quantum 
networks have allocated extra dark fibres to quantum communications, unlike traditional data 
transmission fibres. 
This thesis introduces the realisation and identifies difficulties of a  three node hybrid quantum 
network, Cambridge Quantum Network. Firstly, a secure and high speed QKD encrypted link 
needs to be established both in laboratory using fundamental electrical devices and field with 
commercial advanced equipment. In addition to this advanced commercial QKD system, there 
have been secure key rate analysis comparisons between laboratory fibre coils and practical 
field trials demonstrating the practical QKD link performance. Comparisons based upon the 
highest QKD links help to identify factors that limit future QKD network scale and 
performance.  
Secondly, systematic differences in performance indicates that the secure key rate is 
temperature dependence and then further studies have been done to determine the ambient 
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temperature effect on both transmission optic fibre and the devices. It has been then 
investigated how the polarization mode dispersion, which is supposed to create additional time 
difference between signal and reference pulses, leads to secure key rate changes. The ambient 
temperature changes on optic fibre can incur PMD but it has been proved in this thesis that it 
plays a trivial role in the system. On the other hand, changing of the ambient temperature on 
QKD devices in the lab plays a notably important role in performance of system for the dark 
count rises when temperature goes up.  
Thirdly, for the QKD-WDM system, several classical channels are assigned for system clock, 
reconciliation and classical data and the power level can be 70dB higher than the quantum 
channel. Hence the Raman scattering from any of the classical channels onto quantum channel 
is remarkable. In order to confirm the significance of Raman scattering, the lab scale 
experiments have been conducted and concludes Raman scattering can be the dominant source 
of impairments to secure key rate in long distance QKD – WDM systems. And this type of 
noise can be mitigated by optimisation of the launch power of the classical optical channels, 
subject to maintaining adequate optical signal to noise ratio. In addition, a field trial within 
Cambridge quantum network has been performed and demonstrate the Raman scattering effect 
in real metropolitan QKD links. Last but not the least, an external polarisation controller aims 
to change the state of Raman photon comes from classical channel to be orthogonal to the 
reference signal so that the noise photons could be distinguished at the detector end on account 
of the delay line and hence system performance is optimised potentially. 
7.1 Quantum network with 10/100 Gbps data encrypted by QKD 
In this thesis, it has performed a comparison between laboratory experiment through fibre reels 
and field trial around the Cambridge Quantum network, with long term QKD transmission 
around a triangle between The University’s Electrical Engineering building (CAPE), the main 
Engineering Dept. (ENG) and Toshiba Research (TREL). These links operated continuously 
for several months, with an average QBER around 3.0%  and secure key rate reaches up to 3.2 
Mb/s achieved for point-to-point link trial.  
A field trial of QKD transmission has been performed from Duxford to CAPE, a distance of 
33km with a loss of 7.5dB. This achieved a QBER of 3.4% and secure key rate of 1.4Mb/s. In 
addition, another extended duration field trial has been in operation from the Electrical 
Engineering building to the first node of the NDFIS network at Duxford and back. The total 
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transmission distance is 66km over a loss of 16dB. Here QKD traffic has co-existed with 2 x 
100Gb/s classical traffic, all within the ITU C band for compatibility with telecoms networks.  
The time evolution of QBER in the co-propagating QKD system archived a mean QBER of 
6.62% with a standard deviation of 0.51%. This QBER value should occur at a loss of 16.4dB, 
in excellent agreement with the measured 16dB. And the secure key rate on the QKD link, with 
a mean of 80.2kb/s and standard deviation of 28.4kb/s. The results of this extended trial with 
co-existing classical and QKD signals are in excellent agreement with the previous trial, with 
the QBER increasing from 3.4% to 6.6% with a doubling of transmission distance.  
Field trial results demonstrates the highest long-term secure key rates ever achieved within a 
hybrid quantum network. Based on the analysis of the results, the impact on performance 
caused by the addition of the classical signal and environmental temperature fluctuations have 
been figured out. And also the trial results matches theoretical and predicted results. 
7.2 Factors affect the hybrid quantum network 
In this thesis, system operating temperature and classical channel power level have been 
identified and quantified its corresponding impact on hybrid quantum network performance. 
Firstly, the influence of temperature on the performance of QKD system is summarised from 
field trial performance. Then the relationship between temperature changes and security key 
rate and quantum error rate is analysed and predicted theoretically. It has been proved that the 
time delay effect caused by the change of temperature around the fibre is negligible and will 
not cause abrupt change of performance. The performance of the system is dominated by 
indoor temperature variation. The system is in a high temperature environment will lead to 
poorer performance than that in a lower temperature environment. When the temperature rises 
from 24℃ to 28℃, the security key rate drops from 100kbps to 80kbps (appx 20% decreases) 
and it will be even worse for longer fibre reel connected to the system (> 50km) or link 
attenuation/loss is greater than 10dB. 
Besides, the simulation results are in agreement with the experimental results. When the 
operating temperature of the system increases, the SAPD dark count increases and the security 
key rate decreases. Last but not least, for longer fibres, it is more important to keep the 
operating temperature relatively low and constant. 
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It is also concluded from the field test that the input of traditional communication signal 
weakens the quantum signal to some extent. The higher the traditional input signal will lead to 
the lower safe key rate, and the results show that the input signal increases by 3 dB and the 
secure key rate drops from 2.7 Mbps to 1.3 Mbps. Then, it is theoretically pointed out that the 
conventional optical signal input generates Raman noise to the quantum signal when they two 
are transmitted through the same fibre, which reduces the security key rate and increases the 
value of QBER. Then, the experiment confirmed and quantitated that the 1530nm and 1510nm 
wavelength signals will produce Raman noise to the 1550nm single-photon quantum signal, 
which would affect the performance of the system. Although the Toshiba system in practical 
use generates signals in other bands other than 1510 nm and 1530 nm, such as 1490 nm and 
1570 nm, and Raman noise is proportional to that from other wavelengths, the Raman noise 
from relatively small input power generated by other bands need not be considered. 
At the same time, the short-wavelength and short-wavelength Raman noise are explored, and 
it is proved that 1510nm and 1530nm can be used as the wavelength of traditional 
communication channel. However, in this study, the Toshiba device also pre-limited the 
wavelength of the conventional signal to 1530nm. 
Finally, through the analysis of Toshiba system, it is found that adding the optical polarization 
controller can improve the performance of the system, that is, QBER can improve about 18%. 
However, due to the random angle change of the optical polarization controller, the relationship 
between the photon and the wave plate angle cannot be accurately measured and determined 
quantitatively. Therefore, quantitative analysis can be carried out in the future to further 
improve the impact of Raman noise on the mixed QKD system from the aspect of polarization 
control. 
7.3 Future work 
There are a number of possibilities where the research studies can be taken onto further steps.  
In this thesis, 10 Gb/s and 100 Gb/s modulated data channels have been used in the experiment. 
However, higher or different data rates systems such as 40 and 200 Gb/s have started to become 
available. Incorporating QKD with these systems will be required to be compliant with the next 
generation high speed data systems such as 5G.  
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The work described in this thesis mainly addresses point-to-point QKD links for both 
experiments and field trials. Perhaps the next step would be the implementation of QKD signal 
manoeuvring and routing in the presence of network elements such as routers, network 
switches, and Erbium doped fibre amplifiers. Dynamically switched and reconfigurable 
quantum networks using add drop multiplexers need to be developed to be compatible with the 
existing data communication infrastructure. Using WDM, preliminary theoretical proposals in 
this direction, around the form of link budget calculations for QKD, have been made [86].  
Both QKD and classical data generation equipment are commercial devices and hence very 
limited parameters can be changed during the research. For example, it is not possible to 
experimentally identify what chip or electronic elements in the boxes are significantly thermal 
sensitive. Therefore, there can be a research associated with Toshiba to improve internal 
infrastructure such as adding dynamic and thermostatic compensation part. Also the 
polarisation controller can be embedded onto commercial classical data generation devices. 
In terms of future large scale quantum network, I hope to further address three issues: the first 
is to develop an efficient key management technique that allows multi-point network 
configurations and multicast applications. The Cambridge QKD network is currently only 
available for point-to-point running. Therefore, the job of key management is to monitor the 
link and switch to other secure links. Complex node processing is also not used in this study. 
A multicast application consumes a large number of keys. In order to reduce the security key 
consumptions, a new method of node processing in the users’ data communication layer based 
on network coding may also be helpful.  
The second is to integrate the QKD network technology into an emerging optical 
communication infrastructure, known as photonic network. The optical signal is processed in 
the optical domain and does not need to be converted into an electronic form. The quantum 
network should be realized in the wavelength division multiplexing infrastructure of optical 
network, which corresponds to the lowest layer of photonic network. According to the user's 
request, the efficient QKD link can be directly realized through optical cross-connection and 
reconfigurable optical external multiplexer. With the expansion of quantum transparency range, 
the control signals in the control plane can be tightly encrypted with security keys. In fact, new 
control technologies, such as generalized multi-protocol label switching, make the control 
plane more open to the upper layers of other operators and end users. Malicious hackers may 
also have the opportunity to easily access the control plane, seriously endangering the security 
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of the entire network. QKD will play a key role in the development of secure photonic networks. 
Therefore, it is necessary to further integrate the coexistence of quantum signals and classical 
signals in existing WDM networks and explore more factors that limit the network performance.  
The last is to broaden the QKD application to not only protect data confidentiality from being 
hacked, but also provide internet services, which are the basic functions of current security 
systems, such as identity recognition, authorized certification and digital signature. While QKD 
"unconditionally secure" support still needs further research, it may be achieved using existing 
QKD hardware and different attack models to assume that the enemy is subject to limited 
quantum memory or additional constraints on quantum resources of legitimate parties such as 
quantum processing and quantum memory. In any case, if QKD performance improves further 
and costs are reduced, then the expected QKD network can become the basic infrastructure for 
generating security keys for various cryptographic targets. This may be the main impetus to 
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